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ON THE VIABILITY OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: 
THE CASE OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA1 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Introduction 
During the past three decades, the Inter-American Development Bank (IJ?B) has 
granted the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR) seven loans, in order to fund small and 
medium farmer credit programs at this bank. These efforts have attempted to support the 
expansion and diversification of agricultural production in Costa Rica, in particular through 
improvements in farm productivity. The early emphasis on livestock credit has slowly 
declined, as crops and, more recently, the new non-traditional export activities have 
increased their share of the funds disbursed. 
The amount of each new loan has increased through time, to accumulate a total of 
US$ 84.6 million for the seven projects. These projects have reflected an increasing 
commitment by the IDB of resources for agricultural development in Costa Rica and have 
1 This paper was prepared for the Office of External Review and Evaluation (ORE) of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as background material for the Study of the 
IDE's Experience with Institutional Strengthening Assistance, under the direction of 
Francisco Guzman. The author is responsible for the views expressed here, which may or 
may not be shared by the sponsoring institution. 
2 Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at the Ohio State University. 
Previously, Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Costa Rica. The 
assistance of Ronulfo Jimenez and Martha Castillo, from Academia de Centroamerica in 
San Jose, is ackowledged. The author is grateful for the enthusiastic collaboration of 
Bernardo Chaverri and all other officials at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and for 
comments on this paper by Francisco Guzman. 
1 
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complemented other non-credit IDB programs for the sector. The year, purpose, and total 
amount of the corresponding operations are shown in Table 1.01. 
Table 1.01 Agricultural Credit Operations of the Inter-American Development 
Bank with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 1961-1989. 
Year Purpose Amount 
1961 Livestock development US$ 3.0 million 
1963 Agricultural cooperatives 1.0 million 
1965 Land reclamation, Irazu volcano 5.2 million 
1966 Livestock development 0.4 million 
1972 Livestock development 6.0 million 
1977 Agriculture, livestock development 10.0 million 
1981 Agriculture, livestock development 24.0 million 
1985 Agriculture, livestock development 35.0 million 
Total US$ 84.6 million 
The more recent of these agricultural credit programs have included the "strengthen-
ing of the farm development banking system of Costa Rica" among their stated objectives. 
No formal evaluation of accomplishments in this respect has been undertaken. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the viability of the Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica as a financial intermediary as well as the impact of these IDB programs on the bank's 
increasing search for viability. This examination of the determinants of the bank's viability 
is based on a conceptual framework developed elsewhere, to the extent applicable to this 
particular case. 3 
3 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "On the Viability of Agricultural Development Banks: Con-
ceptual Framework," unpublished Report for the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Columbus, Ohio: Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio 
State University, April, 1990; and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Evaluating the Viability of 
3 
II. The Costa Rican Financial Sector: 
The Costa Rican formal financial sector consists of the National Banking System, 
several public and private non-bank financial institutions, and the National Securities 
Exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores). 
The National Banking System (NBS) consists, in turn, of the Costa Rican Central 
Bank, four state-owned ("nationalized") banks, and 20 private commercial banks, two of 
which are cooperative banks (BANCOOP and Banco Federado).4 The state-owned Banco 
Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR), created in 1914, has been, by far, the largest bank in the 
System. With the recent expansion of private banking, however, its share of the market has 
been declining. The assets size of each bank is shown in Table 2.01. 
Non-bank private financial intermediaries include about 50 regulated finance 
compames (financieras) registered with the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
(Auditorfa General de Entidades Financieras), seven savings and loan associations 
(mutuales), and over 80 credit unions, 54 of which are associated into a large federation 
(FEDECREDITO). Several non-financial cooperatives offer financial services, as well, most 
prominently those associated with FEDECOOP, a large coffee marketing federation. 
Agricultural Development Banks: A Methodology," unpublished Report for the Inter-
American Development Bank. Columbus, Ohio: Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, April, 1990. 
4 As of February, 1990, one of these banks (Banco Internacional de Exportaci6n) was 
being liquidated and another one (Banco Weeden Internacional) had been declared bank-
rupt (Publication of the Auditorfa General de Entidades Financieras in La Naci6n, May 5, 
1990). 
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Table 2.01 Costa Rica: Year of Creation and Assets of the Institutions in the Regulated 
Financial Sector, 1990. (Billion colones and percentages). 
Bank 
State-Owned Banks: 
Nacional de Costa Rica 
de Costa Rica 
Anglo Costarricense 
Credito Agricola 
Other Public Banks: 
Hipotecario Vivienda 
Private Banks: 
Interfin 
BAN COOP 
Ban ex 
de San Jose 
de Fomento Agricola 
del Comercio 
Mercantil 
B.C.T. 
Internacional de C.R. 
Metropolitano 
Year of 
Creation 
1914 
1877 
1863 
1918 
1987 
Germano Centroamericano 
Continental 
1982 
1982 
1981 
1968 
1984 
1979 
1987 
1984 
1987 
1985 
1987 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1977 
1974 
1985 
1947 
Feder ado 
Cofisa 
Fincomer 
de la Construcci6n 
de la Industria 
Lyon 
Financieras (41) 1972-1989 
Assets 
CR$ billion 
201.60 
97.00 
53.71 
31.58 
19.32 
18.55 
31.82 
4.17 
4.13 
3.93 
2.91 
2.49 
2.23 
2.13 
1. 75 
1. 56 
1.46 
1.36 
1.10 
0.97 
0.77 
0.36 
0.25 
0.15 
0.09 
5.21 
% 
78.4 
37.7 
20.9 
12.3 
7.5 
7.2 
12.4 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.1 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
2.0 
Source: Auditoria General de Entidades Financieras, La Naci6n, May 5, 1990. 
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Other semi-formal and informal lenders include a wide range of agents, from input 
suppliers and rural traders, processors and exporters of agricultural products (e.g. coffee 
beneficios), and local grocery stores (pulperfas), to private voluntary organizations (PVOs), 
non-regulated financieras, friends, relatives, and moneylenders. 
There are several public sector entities that offer financial services, including the 
housing mortgage bank (Banco Nacional Hipotecario de la Vivienda, BANHVI), the na-
tional housing institute (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, INVU), the workers' 
savings bank (Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal), the national insurance institute 
(Instituto Nacional de Seguros. INS), the social security system (Caja Costarricense de 
Seguro Social, CCSS), the Agrarian Fund (Caja Agraria) at the agrarian development 
institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA), the cooperatives institute (INFOCOOP), 
and several others. 
Created in 1950, the Central Bank has been in charge of the country's exchange rate, 
monetary, and credit policies, and of the coordination of the state-owned banks. It enjoys 
a monopoly in the conversion of foreign exchange into colones, with the state-owned and 
private banks acting as its agents for this purpose. Only the state-owned banks have been 
allowed to accept foreign currency deposits from the public, but they must surrender 100 
percent of these deposits to the Central Bank. Since 1983, the Central Bank has set the 
bank exchange rate of the colon following a crawling-peg regime that attempts to keep the 
real exchange rate constant. During the past few years, the black-market exchange rate has 
diverged from the bank rate by no more than 10 percent. 
6 
The Central Bank is authorized to set interest rates and commissions on loans and 
deposits as well as reserve requirements on deposits in banks and private finance companies. 
It also sets the terms for rediscounting from the state-owned banks and it conducts open 
market operations, through sales and purchases of stabilization bonds. It is authorized to 
set limits on credit availability, through the monetary program. For a long time, the Central 
Bank regulated the volume and the composition of outstanding state-owned-bank loans, 
according to categories of economic activity, by setting portfolio limits known as topes de 
cartera. 
The Central Bank authorizes the establishment of new banks and the operation of 
new bank branches by existing banks. It can extend credit to the state-owned banks, the 
Central Government, and some public-sector entitites. Since 1984 it can also extend credit 
to the private commercial banks, but only with funds obtained from foreign agencies and 
multilateral organizations. During the past five years, the Central Bank has substantially 
redefined its role and modified its style of policy management, as a dimension of a financial 
liberalization program, to be described below. 
Prudential supervision of the formal financial system is in the hands of the Auditorfa 
General de Entidades Financieras (AGEF), following the new 1988 Banking Law (Ley de 
Modernizaci6n del Sistema Financiero ), with authority over the state-owned and private 
commercial banks and the private finance companies. It replaced the Auditorfa General de 
Ban cos, with a greater degree of autonomy from the Central Bank. Credit unions and other 
cooperatives are nominally supervised by the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo 
(INFOCOOP). 
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The state-owned banks, three of which were "nationalized" in 1948 to act as commer-
cial, mortgage, and development banks, are the Banco N acional de Costa Rica, the Banco 
de Costa Rica, the Banco Anglo Costarricense, and the Banco Credito Agricola de Car-
tago.5 These four state-owned banks have enjoyed a monopoly in the mobilization' of de-
mand and savings deposits from the public (in practice, deposits at less than 60 days) and 
only these four banks have had access to Central Bank rediscounting. 
In the mid-1980s, the state-owned banks operated a network of 340 branches 
throughout the country. This made Costa Rica one of the Latin American countries with 
the lowest ratio of population per bank branch, third only after Uruguay and Trinidad and 
Tobago.6 This network included over 100 of the Banco Nacional's small farmer outlets 
(Juntas Rurales de Credito Agricola). 
The number of private commercial banks has doubled since 1982. Mter the 1948 
"nationalization" decree, only the Banco Lyon had remained in operation, but it has never 
-
mobilized deposits from the public. Banco de San Jose, created in 1968, was the first one 
of the new generation of private commercial banks. Three more private banks were created 
in the 1970s, while all others did not appear until the 1980s, mostly in response to the 
5 Although the decree by the 1948 Junta describes it as a "nationalization," the three 
expropriated private banks were actually locally owned. The BNCR, on the other hand, had 
been a state bank since 1914. 
6 Federaci6n Latinoamericana de Bancos, Gufa Bancaria Latinoamericana, Bogota: 
FELABAN, 1986. 
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desintermediation that accompanied the crisis in the early 1980s.7 They are subject to the 
same Central Bank credit and interest rate policies as the state-owned banks. 
The private commercial banks have funded their lending operations with term 
deposits of maturities of six months and over (certificados de inversi6n), their own' capital 
resources, access to Central Bank lines of credit where the funds have been foreign, and 
loans from other foreign sources. Many of these banks own subsidiaries abroad ("las 
panameftas"), where deposits are mobilized and loans are granted to Costa Rican firms. 
Particularly important have been the lines of credit created at the Central Bank by the 
Agency for International Development (AID) in an effort to promote private banking in 
Costa Rica. 
The private commercial banks have been concentrated in the urban areas and have 
lent primarily for industrial and commercial purposes, to a well-established clientele. They 
have recently accounted for over one-half of lending to the industrial sector. In the rural 
areas, however, they have not represented a competitive threat for the state-owned banks. 
Credit unions and some agricultural processors, particularly the coffee beneficios, have 
offered some competition to the state-owned banks in the countryside. 
Regulated private finance companies increased from 41 at the end of 1982, to 66 by 
mid-1987, just before several of them experienced difficulties and some went bankrupt. At 
present, given the more strict criteria for their operation established in the 1988 Banking 
Law, there are 46 active empresas financieras no bancarias and 11 inactive finance 
7 Banco de la Construcci6n (1974), Banco Fincomer (1977), and Banco del Comercio 
(1979). 
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companies.8 The operations of these intermediaries have been similar to those of the 
private commercial banks, but they have not had access to Central Bank credit lines at all. 
Their loanable funds have thus been limited to term deposits ( certificados de inversion), 
their own capital resources, and foreign loans. They are subject to Central Bank reserve 
requirements, set by the 1988 Banking Law at a maximum of 10 percent, and to the Bank's 
interest rate regulations. There have also been non-regulated finance companies, defined 
as firms in which credit and other financial operations account for less than 50 percent of 
their overall activity. Regulated and non-regulated finance companies have held about three 
percent of the financial sector's assets.9 
The private savings and loan associations (mutuales) have financed construction and 
home purchases by their members, with funds from savings raised among their associates 
and from term deposits, sales of mortgages in the secondary market (Balsa), and loans from 
a state-owned bank with AID resources. 
FEDECREDITO and the affiliated credit unions have aggressively mobilized both 
member shares and voluntary deposits from the public. Despite significant success in the 
1980s, due to incorrect policy guidelines from the Federation, mismanagement, and in a few 
cases fraud, several credit unions have experienced severe financial difficulties since 1987 
and many had to be bailed out in 1990. 
8 According to a list published by the Auditorfa General de Entidades Financieras in La 
Naci6n, May 5, 1990. 
9 As estimated by an IDB Mission in 1986. 
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Non-financial cooperatives became important sources of financial services after the 
crisis in the early 1980s. These cooperatives, credit unions, and several PVOs working with 
microenterprise promotion programs have become important channels for foreign and 
multilateral agency funds in the 1980s. 
The Banco Popular, not under the authority of the Central Bank, is run by a Board 
that includes representatives from the labor unions, the employers, and the government. Its 
lending operations have been funded mainly from a payroll tax paid both by workers and 
employers (forced savings) and from voluntary savings and term deposits mobilized from the 
public. This bank has been specialized in consumer loans and other forms of "development" 
lending. It has required several restructuring efforts, given major deficiencies in its manage-
ment and institutional design. 
The social security system (CCSS) extends credit for housing, funded by the workers' 
pension contributions (including the portions contributed by the employers and the govern-
ment, in addition to the workers'), but a substantial amount of the pension reserves accumu-
lated have been invested in Central Government bonds. The INS extends credit for housing, 
as well, funded by insurance reserves. The large teacher's savings association (ANDE) 
extends credit to members, funded with pension contributions. 
The national housing mortgage bank (BANHVI) was created in late 1986, to finance 
long-term housing mortgages, mostly with resources transferred from the Central Govern-
ment and the CCSS and from sales of mortgages in the secondary market. The lending 
operations of other public-sector entities, such as INVU, the institute for the development 
of local governments (IFAM), and INFOCOOP are mainly funded with Central Government 
11 
fiscal transfers and foreign loans. Public sector financial entities hold substantial amounts 
of Central Government bonds and thus represent a source of financing for the fiscal deficit. 
Until recently, CODESA, a public development corporation, was both a major user 
of Central Bank and foreign credit and a source of funds and guarantees for its subsidiaries 
and a few private sector firms. Unable to promote profitable activities, CODESA has been 
recently engaged in a process of privatization of its subsidiaries, with assistance from AID 
and the World Bank. 
The National Securities Exchange (Bolsa), created in 1976, experienced significant 
growth in the 1980s, in part as a response to the acute bank desintermediation process that 
took place early in the decade. Total transactions increased from 4.8 billion colones in 1982 
(about 5 percent of GDP), to 82.1 billion colones in 1986 (about 34 percent of GDP): Since 
annual transactions turnover was estimated at about 4.9 in 1986, the value of the assets 
negotiated was estimated at 16.8 billion colones. 
The Bolsa does not actually function as an equity market of any importance. Rather, 
it is a market for trading debt instruments. Although transactions of private sector financial 
assets grew from about 8 percent of total transactions in 1982, to about 25 percent in 1986, 
public sector financial assets, notably Central Government bonds, Central Bank stabilization 
bonds, and certificates of deposit issued by the state-owned banks, explained about 69 per-
cent of transactions growth in that period. The increased participation of Government 
bonds in transactions at the Bolsa reflected a policy shift in the financing of the Central 
Government deficit. Up to 1982, the fiscal deficit was largely financed with foreign loans 
and domestic credit from the Central Bank and the state-owned banks. Afterwards, as a 
12 
result of macroeconomic st~bilization programs, limits have been set on the amount of bank 
credit for the non-financial public sector. An increasing portion of the public sector deficit 
has thus been financed with sales of bonds to the private sector at the Bolsa.10 
Important reasons for the insignificant trading in equity instruments may have been 
a tax regime that penalizes equity financing compared to debt financing and a strong saver 
preference for short-term instruments, as a consequence of uncertainty about macroeconom-
ic conditions.11 Savers have also shown a preference for holding Gover"ument and Central 
Bank bonds and certificates of deposit issued by the state-owned banks, which they judge 
to be free of default risk, rather than claims on private sector non-financial firms. In the 
presence of economies of scale, only large firms have afforded the direct placement of 
securities with the public. The Bolsa has become, on the other hand, an important 
mechanism for the mobilization of relatively low-cost, short-term funds for the private banks 
and other financial intermediaries, in the presence of the state-owned banks' monopoly on 
short-term deposit mobilization. 
Despite the rapid growth of non-bank financial intermediaries and of transactions in 
private debt instruments at the Bolsa in recent times, loans from the National Banking 
System continue to be the most important source of financing for domestic firms in the 
10 This description of the Costa Rican financial system has followed closely the report 
by Minor Sagot, "Financial Intermediation in Costa Rica: Status and Prospects," San Jose: 
Unpublished document, USAID Mission, June, 1987. 
I 
11 While corporate profits are subject to a progressive income tax scale and dividends 
to an additional tax, interest paid on liabilities can be deducted as an operating cost for tax 
purposes. 
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modern sector, both for investment and for working capital. Similarly, since monetary and 
quasi-monetary instruments continue to be the most important financial assets held in wealth 
portfolios, the legal monopoly of the state-owned banks' in the mobilization of deposits from 
the public explains much of their preeminence, despite the poor quality of many of the 
financial services that they have provided. Only recently has the quality of some of the 
services offered by the state-owned banks improved, as a response to the intense competi-
tion from the private commercial banks in some market segments. The private banks are 
headquartered in San Jose, however, with no branches in the countryside. In the rural 
areas, competition for the state-owned banks has had to come from credit unions and other 
semi-formal intermediaries, such as the coffee beneficios. 
III. Financial Deepening in Costa Rica 
During the 1950s, the 1960s, and most of the 1970s, Costa Rica experienced a sig-
nificant process of financial deepening and its financial markets served as an important 
mechanism for economic growth. On the basis of traditional measures of financial perfor-
mance, the evolution of the Costa Rican financial system during that period has to be 
evaluated positively, compared to financial performance in other developing countries. The 
range of the services offered widened, the network of bank branches was substantially ex-
panded, the returns to domestic financial assets were positive, when measured in real terms, 
and all financial magnitudes, measured in constant prices, grew rapidly. 
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Table 3.01 Costa Rica: National Banking System. Money and Credit Aggregates. 
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Real Terms. (Percentages). 
1950-1986. . 
1950-62 1962-70 1970-78 1978-82 1982-86 
Net Domestic Credit 10.2 5.5 11.1 -17.7 18.1 
Net Public Sector 4.6 8.7 20.6 -7.7 22.8 
Private Sector 11.3 5.1 8.8 -22.6 14.0 
Other Net Domestic Assets 6.9 8.9 20.4 46.3 14.2 
Total•Liquidity (M2) 1 8.8 7.6 13.8 -8.9 10.4 
Quasimoney1 11.4 8.3 21.0 -5.6 8.9 
Money (M1) 7.7 7.2 8.5 -13.6 12.8 
Foreign Borrowing by Banks n.a. 7.9 19.0 16.5 30.8 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index. 
1 Includes foreign-currency deposits. 
Table 3.02 Costa Rica: National Banking System. Ratios of Money and Credit 
Aggregates to the GDP. (Percentages). 1950-1986. 
Net Domestic Credit 
Net Public Sector 
Private Sector 
Total Liquidity (M2) 1 
Quasimoney1 
Money (M1) 
1950 
21.6 
4.6 
17.0 
18.4 
4.4 
14.0 
1962 
30.2 
3.4 
26.8 
21.8 
7.0 
14.8 
1970 
28.9 
4.1 
24.7 
24.4 
8.3 
16.1 
1978 
40.5 
11.1 
29.4 
41.6 
22.9 
18.7 
1982 
33.1 
14.4 
18.7 
51.0 
32.4 
18.6 
1986 
36.3 
18.4 
17.8 
42.6 
25.7 
16.9 
Source: Computed from data Ln Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
1 Includes foreign-currency deposits. 
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Rapid economic growth and price and exchange rate stability explained this progress. 
Up to the mid-1970s, Costa Rica was characterized by remarkable price stability. Between 
1950 and 1969, the average annual rate of change of the Consumer Price Index was below 
two percent per yearY Double-digit inflation was not experienced until 1973. This ab-
sence of inflation reflected the openness of the economy and an exchange rate that was 
fixed for long periods of time. The domestic price level was determined, therefore, by 
international price movements, during a period when international inflation was minimal. 
The fixed exchange rate reflected, in turn, a preference for monetary stability. The 
country was willing to adopt enough of the monetary and fiscal discipline necessary to 
sustain the exchange rate and "maintenance of the external value of the colon" was a major 
objective of Central Bank policy. 
As a consequence, Costa Rica experienced a significant degree of financial deepen-
mg. Table 3.01 shows that both the money supply (M2), in the broad sense of currency and 
demand, savings, and term deposits, as well as domestic credit increased rapidly, when 
measured in real terms, during those three decades. As shown in Table 3.02, the ratio of 
M2 to the GDP augmented from 18 percent in 1950 to 24 percent in 1970 and to 42 percent 
in 1978. Most of this increase resulted from the growth of quasimoney, particularly in the 
1970s, as changing preferences for liquidity, risk, and returns led to the diversification of 
financial-asset portfolios. Similarly, the ratio of domestic credit to the GDP increased from 
12 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Financial Development in Costa Rica. A Long-Term 
View," San Jose: Unpublished report to the US AID Mission, under the Ohio State U niversi-
ty Program, September, 1988. 
16 
22 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1978P Growth of the domestic credit to GDP ratio 
was in part due to the increasing use of foreign, rather than domestic, savings for the 
expansion of credit portfolios. 
All of these ratios became comparatively high in the 1970s, particularly in contrast 
with other Latin American countries where high and erratic rates of inflation had resulted 
in severe financial repression. They reflected an increasingly successful effort to mobilize 
domestic resources through the banking system, despite Costa Rica's comparatively low 
ratios of domestic savings to national income. 
Most of the "monetization" of the economy and the provision of a means of payments 
took place before the 1960s, since by then the ratio of the money supply in strict sense (Ml) 
to the GDP had reached contemporary levels. Subsistence, non-monetary transactions 
became an insignificant proportion of the Costa Rican economy since the early 1950s, while 
banking habits were rapildy adopted by the population. 
The largest portion of this impressive process of financial deepening was associated, 
therefore, with growing holdings of quasimoney, as shown in Table 3.03. The ratio of 
quasimoney to the GDP increased from 4.2 percent in 1961 to 19.2 percent in 1978. As 
inflationary pressures mounted after the mid-1970s and the opportunity cost of transactions 
balances augmented, these balances were increasingly kept in new forms, different from 
checking accounts. In the 1980s, foreign currencies substituted for much of these balances. 
13 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Crisis y el Sistema Bancario Costarricense," Ciencias 
Econ6micas, V:1, 1985, pp. 63-74. 
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Table 3.03 Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of Money and 
Credit Aggregates (Percentages). 1950-1986. 
1950 1962 1970 1978 1982 1986 
Net Domestic Credit 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public Sector 21.1 11.3 14.3 27.5 43.4 50.8 
Private Sector 78.9 88.7 85.7 72.5 56.6 49.2 
Total Liquidity (M2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Quasimoney 24.0 32.2 33.9 55.1 63.6 60.2 
Money (M1) 76.0 67.8 66.1 44.9 36.4 39.8 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito y 
Cuentas Monetarias, several years. 
A difficult question refers to the extent to which financial deepening may have been 
facilitated or retarded by the "nationalization" of the banks in 1948. On the one hand, all 
of the other Central American countries, where the banks had not been nationalized, 
experienced similarly vigorous financial progress.14 This was everywhere a result of price 
and exchange-rate stability, which made the real returns on domestic financial assets posi-
tive. In the case of Costa Rica, financial deepening also reflected rapid and sustained 
economic growth and political stability. 
Despite financial deepening, however, Costa Rica's domestic savings ratio has been 
particularly low and the country has relied heavily on foreign savings for the financing of its 
domestic investment. In the early 1980s, the excessive accumulation of foreign debt con-
tributed to the breakdown of the foreign exchange regime and to a severe process of 
14 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Jeffrey Poyo, "Central American Financial Dev-
elopment," in William Asher and Ann Hubbard, eds. Central American Recovery and 
Development. Task Force Report to the International Commission for Central American 
Recovery and Development. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 
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financial repression, described below. This process accentuated the deficiencies that the 
system had accumulated, despite the rapid growth of financial magnitudes. 
The "nationalization" led, on the other hand, to an expansion of the network of bank 
branches well beyond what could have been expected otherwise, while the idea that the 
state-owned banks cannot go bankrupt might have promoted depositor confidence. At the 
time of the "nationalization" there were 43 bank branches in the country, one for every 
20,000 inhabitants. Of these, moreover, 38 belonged to the Banco Nacional. By 1986, on 
the other hand, there were 248 bank branches, namely, one for every 10,000 persons. 
The monopoly of the mobilization of deposits enjoyed by the state-owned banks has 
been reflected, nevertheless, by the poor quality of the services provided to the depositors, 
who have had to incur in high transaction costs. These costs have discouraged many from 
holding domestic financial assets. 
Financial deepening in Costa Rica seems to have been more the result, therefore, of 
appropriate macroeconomic policies that maintained price stability for a long time, than of 
explicit concerns with financial intermediation, and particularly with deposit mobilization, 
by the state-owned banks. When macroeconomic management failed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the system rapidly collapsed. 
IV. Impact of the Crisis on the Financial System 
Probably more than any other sector in the economy, the financial system suffered 
significantly with the crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, as described below. There was 
a fiscal reason for this. When the stagnation and contraction of real incomes in the early 
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1980s reduced the rate of growth of government revenues, the authorities faced severe 
constraints for an additional mobilization of domestic resources through the use of the 
conventional tools of taxation. At the same time, public-sector expenditures and implicit, 
non-recorded subsidies and entitlements kept growing. 
Given the increasing discrepancy between public-sector revenues and expenditures, 
for a while the authorities financed their budget deficits by placing more debt abroad. 
When the limit to the accumulated stock of public external debt which foreign lenders were 
willing to accept was finally reached, and expenditures had not been reduced yet, the 
authorities forced the placement of their debt with the domestic financial system. 
Domestic bank financing of public sector deficits had two consequences. First, the 
expansion of domestic credit at a rate faster than the rate that would have maintained 
domestic price stability made it impossible to sustain the fixed exchange-rate regime and it 
resulted in the loss of the country's international monetary reserves, in accelerating inflation, 
and eventually devaluation. The Wholesale Price Index increased 65 percent in 1981 and 
108 percent in 1982. December to December, this index augmented 117 percent in 1981 and 
79 percent in 1982. The Consumer Price Index increased 65 percent in 1981 and 90 percent 
in 1982. The exchange rate increased even faster than domestic prices; it grew seven-fold 
in less than two years. Foreign exchange controls, multiple exchange rates, and a floating-
rate system were adopted. 
Second, the private sector was crowded out of domestic bank credit portfolios, as the 
share of the public sector grew rapidly. Growing fiscal deficits were thus financed with the 
loss of international monetary reserves, accelerating borrowing abroad, and the inflation tax 
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and financial repression as well as with a substantial expansion of the share of the public 
sector in domestic credit volumes. The accompanying financial repression led to a signifi-
cant contraction, in real terms, of all dimensions of the Costa Rican formal financial system. 
The rapid process of financial deepening experienced by Costa Rica in the· earlier 
decades had accelerated in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1975, in real terms domestic funds 
mobilization by the banking system had increased at a rate of 6 percent per year. Moreover, 
between 1975 and 1978, this rate reached an exceptional 20 percent per year, as a conse-
quence of the coffee boom. Between 1978 and 1982, on the other hand, domestic funds 
mobilization declined at an annual rate of 7 percent, as a consequence of financial repres-
sion brought about by the fiscal crisis. Currency substitution became substantial. By 1981, 
deposits in foreign currencies accounted for 28 percent of quasi-money. Deposits in US 
dollars increased to represent 11 percent of GDP in 1983. 
The contraction of the Costa Rican banking system as a result of the crisis was 
dramatic. In constant 1978 prices, domestic funds mobilization dropped from 12.8 billion 
colones in 1978, to 9.6 billion in 1982. By 1982, M2 represented only 69 percent of its 1978 
real value, after a drop from 12.1 to 8.3 billion colones. The sharpest reduction was 
experienced by M1, which diminished from 5.4 billion colones in 1978, to 3.0 billion in 1982. 
This was only 56 percent of the real value reached in 1978 and was comparable to the level 
already reached by 1970. Although the reduction of quasimonetary deposits was less 
dramatic, by 1982 they represented 79 percent of their 1978 real value. As a result, the ratio 
of M2 to the GDP declined to 29 percent in 1981. If dollar deposits in Costa Rican banks 
are excluded, this ratio further declined to 21 percent. 
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Table 4.01 National Banking System. Credit Volumes. Index: 1978:100. 
1970 1975 1978 1981 1982 1983 
Credit outstanding (end of December): 
Total 50.3 71.5 100.0 46.1 35.5 51.0 
Crops 78.5 72.9 100.0 51.5 46.0 72.6 
Livestock 56.1 78.0 100.0 43.4 37.7 55.9 
Industry 38.1 69.5 100.0 38.8 33.2 51.0 
Commerce 24.3 89.6 100.0 65.9 46.7 42.9 
Services 31.7 57.0 100.0 37.6 19.2 21.9 
Housing 40.1 55.9 100.0 54.1 32.6 39.5 
Personal 41.8 86.5 100.0 46.7 18.6 15.1 
New loans granted during the year: 
Total 57.9 87.7 100.0 50.7 48.5 58.1 
Crops 94.6 102.7 100.0 75.8 91.2 106.9 
Livestock 50.1 65.3 100.0 47.1 60.8 65.6 
Industry 49.2 90.6 100.0 32.7 37.2 48.0 
Commerce 38.3 133.8 100.0 103.0 58.7 59.9 
Services 84.9 126.7 100.0 70.7 11.2 14.5 
Housing 23.6 56.7 100.0 40.4 21.6 36.8 
Personal 20.4 40.9 100.0 25.3 10.4 13.7 
Source: Gonzalez-Vega (1985) 
A similar contraction was experienced by the real value of domestic credit. Between 
1970 and 1975, real domestic credit had increased at an average annual rate of 7.1 percent. 
Domestic credit further increased (twice as rapidly during 1975-1978) through 1980, when 
it reached 14.1 billion of constant 1978 colones, aided by the inflow of foreign loans. During 
1981 and 1982, however, domestic credit dropped dramatically. By 1982 it had declined to 
5.9 billion, only 42 percent of the 1980 level. After some recuperation in 1983, real 
domestic credit was still at its pre-1975 level.15 
15See Tables 1.05 and 1.06 in the Statistical Annex, as well as Graphs 1.08 and 1.12. 
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The contraction was particularly acute in the case of domestic credit for the private 
sector, which declined from 8.6 billion in 1978, to 3.1 billion by 1982, only 36 percent of the 
former real value. In a few years, the National Banking System's supply of loanable funds 
to the private sector had been reduced to about one-third of its original real value·. This 
reflected both the erosion of the purchasing power of loan portfolios with rapid inflation and 
the crowding out of private sector financing in those portfolios. 
This loss of access to bank credit by Costa Rican firms took place at a time when 
inflation and devaluation had also reduced the real value of their own working capital and 
when they had lost access to foreign loans, in view of Costa Rica's moratorium in the 
payment of its public external debt and of the expectations created by political turmoil 
elsewhere in Central America. 
Domestic credit for the public sector continued to increase through 1980, when it 
reached 6.2 billion constant colones of 1978. The following two years, however, it also 
dramatically declined. By 1982, it amounted to only 2.9 billion, which represented 46 
percent of its 1980 level. Thus, in the race between the nominal expansion of credit for the 
public sector and inflation, inflation was eventually the easy winner. 
The crowding out of the private sector in loan portfolios was pronounced. The share 
of the private sector in domestic credit had only declined from 87 percent in 1961 to 80 
percent by 1975. However, by 1981 this share had dropped to 56 percent (see Table 3.03). 
Moreover, from the perspective of the annual net increments in domestic credit, before 1974 
the private sector received at least three-quarters every year. This participation had 
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declined to one-third by 1980. This evolution of the shares of the two sectors in the 
allocation of domestic credit reflected the fiscal root of the process of financial repression. 
Significant portions of the portfolios of the banking system became overdue towards 
the end of the 1970s. To the extent to which these loans had not been written ciff, the 
figures reported here imply an underestimation of the actual reduction in the availability of 
the banks' loanable funds. This has become evident more recently, when the uncollectable 
loans have finally been written off. 
The decline of these financial ratios also reflected, in part, the loss in relative market 
share of the regulated market participants. In recent years, there has been a vigorous 
development of non-regulated financial institutions. Not contrained by interest-rate and 
other Central Bank regulations, these non-regulated intermediaries have been more 
aggressive in the mobilization of domestic funds than the formal institutions. In this sense, 
the reduction in the levels of total financial intermediation in Costa Rica has been less than 
what is reported here. 
V. Central Bank Policies: The Topes de Cartera 
In addition to the traditional monetary functions, the Central Bank of Costa Rica has 
been entrusted with the coordination of the National Banking System and the promotion of 
economic development. Until recently, one of its main policy instruments had been the to-
pes de cartera, ceilings on the amounts of credit outstanding by type of economic activity. 
With these quantitative/qualitative limits on credit volumes, the authorities had attempted 
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to influence both the rate of expansion of domestic credit and the pattern of resource 
allocation. 
The Central Bank had been involved in the design of rationing criteria ( cuadros de 
avfo ), as well. The avfos are maximum amounts to be financed, usually per unit of land, for 
each particular crop. These amounts have been based on hypothetical costs of production, 
frequently uniform for the whole country, estimated for the best available technology. 
While the topes were used to channel credit towards priority sectors or to discourage 
lending for non-preferred activities, the avfos were rules for loan-amount credit rationing 
in the presence of under-equilibrium interest rates.16 Non-price credit rationing gave 
politicians, through their control of the tope process, a tool to exercise their patronage and 
to promote support for their political parties, by responding to the credit demands of 
specific constituencies. The state-owned banks' "development" objectives were thus fre-
quently replaced by "electoral" considerations. 
Over time, the shortcomings of the tope system became evident. The system suf-
fered, indeed, from all the costs and deficiencies of credit targeting, in large scale. The 
credit program designed by the Central Bank contained quarterly limits on loans outstanding 
per bank, for a large number of categories (sometimes over 70). The multitude of frequent-
ly overlapping and inconsistent ceilings became expensive for the state-owned banks to 
16 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Credit Rationing Behavior of Agricultural Lenders: The Iron 
Law of Interest Rate Restrictions," in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von 
Pischke, eds., Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit in Developing Countries. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
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administer, while the Central Bank had to distract resources from its more basic monetary 
functions for the design and supervision of the credit program. Given insufficient informa-
tion and undefined criteria, often the Central Bank's credit program simply reflected projec-
tions of the ceilings for the previous year, despite lack of compliance by the state..!owned 
banks, as well as the requests for modifications from specific politicians. 
In this environment, the establishment and implementation of the topes became in-
creasingly vulnerable to interest-group pressures. Rather than a maximum of credit allowed 
per activity, the tope was interpreted as an entitlement which obligated the state-owned 
banks to lend the amount of the ceiling for each particular purpose. This made it difficult 
for the Central Bank to use the topes as an instrument to control the expansion of credit, 
since any reduction would imply a curtailment of these entitlements. 
The risk-averse state-owned banks, on the other hand, interpreted that they were not 
authorized to lend for a particular purpose, unless the corresponding tope line item had 
-
been included in the credit program. In this way they passed on the blame for the general 
shortage of credit to the monetary authorities ("we are sorry, there is no tope"), but were 
still able to accommodate preferred clients when necessary ("there is no tope, but we can 
help you"). As a result, year after year the banks essentially made the same loans, despite 
major changes in circumstances, and there was little room for innovating lending. 
Given the impossibility to accurately forecast the composition of the demand for 
credit, numerous revisions of the credit program were required during each year. Despite 
these modifications, the banks hardly ever complied with the regulations. Moreover, excess 
demands for credit for some purposes and excess supplies for others, that could not be easily 
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corrected, increased the rigidity of bank management as well as the transaction costs for the 
banks and the borrowers. Soon the clients learned, however, to apply for loans for activities 
for which topes were available and to rely on fungibility for the implementation of their 
desired production plans. 
Over the years, several reforms were adopted in order to minimize the deficiencies 
of the system, including a drastic reduction of the number of categories in the late 1970s 
and, in the mid-1980s, the Central Bank undertook a major deregulation of the system, 
eventually resulting in the complete elimination of the topes and the withdrawal of the 
Central Bank from the process of determination of the avfosP 
Similar problems had become evident with respect to the avfos, particularly after 
inflation accelerated and more frequent revisions became necessary. Efforts by several 
interest groups have attempted to influence the estimation of costs of production and the 
determination of the proportion of these costs to be financed by the banks. Over time, the 
producers have interpreted the amount of the avfo as an entitlement to a given loan size, 
independent of individual circumstances. Given the enormous heterogeneity of farmers, the 
application of a uniform avfo has resulted in major inefficiencies and inequities. Although 
the Central Bank is not involved in setting avfos any longer, their use by the state-owned 
banks is an important credit management issue. 
17 Miguel Lorfa, "Costa Rica. Marco General para la Formulaci6n de la Politica Mo-
netaria y Crediticia," San Jose: Unpublished report to USAID, under the Ohio State 
University Project, 1988. 
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VI. Central Bank Policies: Interest Rates 
The Central Bank is authorized, as well, to set deposit and loan rates of interest. 
The tope system provided, in effect, ample opportunities for interest-rate differentiation: 
there was a different interest rate for each line item in the credit program, with 'a wide 
margin between the lowest and the highest rates authorized. Several subsidized interest 
rates were also established by law, as an institutionalization of entitlements for specific 
groups (rural women, cooperatives, and the like). 
Table 6.04. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Size Distribution 
of Agricultural Credit (Percentages). 1974 and 1981. 
1974 1981 
Size Cumulative Percentages Cumulative Percentages 
(CR$) Number Amount Number Amount 
Less than 1,000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
From 1,001 to 5,000 89.89 99.82 97.50 100.00 
From 5,001 to 15,000 47.61 96.68 70.50 99.20 
From 15,001 to 50,000 22.83 90.83 33.80 96.20 
From 50,001 to 100,000 8.52 80.98 13.50 91.30 
From 100,001 to 500,000 4.50 73.44 8.70 88.20 
From 500,001 to 1,000,000 1.19 55.60 3.40 77.80 
Over 1,000,000 0.70 46.43 2.20 70.10 
Sources: Vogel (1984) and Loria (1982). 
Given extremely low levels of inflation, of less than two percent per year in the 1950s 
and the 1960s, in those days even the preferential rates were positive in real terms and the 
implicit subsidy was moderate. With the acceleration of inflation in the 1970s, on the other 
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hand, real interest rates became negative and the subsidy became substantial and highly 
concentrated in a few hands.18 
Despite the "nationalization" of the banks, there has been a high concentration of 
credit portfolios in Costa Rica. As shown by Vogel (1984), the distribution of loans by size 
has been more unequal than the distribution of land or the distribution of income. More-
over, as shown in Table 6.04, concentration has been increasing, as would be predicted by 
the iron law of interest-rate restrictions.19 In 1974, less than 10 percent of the number of 
borrowers received more than 80 percent of the amounts disbursed for agriculture by the 
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. In 1981, when real interest rates became particularly 
negative, less than 10 percent of the borrowers received more than 90 percent of those 
amounts.20 As a consequence of this concentration, few have benefited from most. of the 
implicit interest-rate subsidy, particularly during inflationary periods, when the real rates of 
interest on loans have become negative. 
18 Robert C. Vogel, "The Effect of Subsidized Agricultural Credit on Income Distribu-
tion in Costa Rica," in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke, eds. 
Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit in Developing Countries, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
19Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Credit Rationing Behavior of Agricultural Lenders: The Iron 
Law of Interest-Rate Restrictions, in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von 
Pischke, eds. Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit in Developing Countries, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
20 Miguel Loria, "La Demanda de Credito en Costa Rica," San Jose: Unpublished 
Thesis, University of Costa Rica, 1982. 
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As an example, under the conservative assumption that the social opportunity cost 
of the funds was 10 percent per year, in real terms, the rate effectively charged on loans 
during 1974 was a negative -20 percent. Thus, the implicit rate of subsidy was 30 percent. 
Agricultural credit represented close to 60 percent of the value added in agriculture and 
over one-half of the loan portfolio of the banks. This meant that, in the important case of 
agriculture, the amount of the grant transferred through subsidized credit was equivalent to 
20 to 25 percent of value added in the sector. On the other hand, only about 30 percent of 
the agricultural producers of the country had access to bank loans, while the remaining 70 
percent were excluded from access to formal credit and thus from the subsidy. 
In addition, in 1974 there was a high degree of portfolio concentration. In the case 
of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which granted over one-half of all formal agricultural 
credit in the country, less than two percent of the borrowers accounted for over 60 percent 
of the amounts loaned. This meant that less than one percent of the agricultural producers 
of Costa Rica received more than 60 percent of the agricultural credit granted by the state-
owned banks and over 60 percent of a substantial subsidy, equivalent to almost 25 percent 
of the value added in agriculture in 1974. Contrary to the expectations of the "nationaliza-
tion" decree, the state-owned banks have thus contributed to a worsening of the country's 
wealth distribution. Moreover, by the end of the decade it was estimated that about 40 
percent of the loan portfolio of the banks represented defaulted loans. There was a 
significant transfer on this count, as well, mostly to the few privileged very large borrowers 
who did not repay their loans. 
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Until the mid-1970s, the interest rates paid on deposits were never much of a concern 
for the authorities. With the acceleration of inflation and the resulting capital flight in the 
late 1970s, however, the Central Bank began to pay attention to the rewards to depositors. 
In 1978, a partial financial reform raised real interest rates to positive levels for a few 
months and a high interest elasticity of deposits was revealed. This reform failed, neverthe-
less, due to the absence of fiscal control and the resulting inflationary pressures. 
Thus, while the interest-rate reform stimulated deposit mobilization, the financing of 
the public sector deficit crowded out the private sector from bank credit portfolios. The 
explosive fiscal disequilibrium of the early 1980s eventually resulted in a further acceleration 
of inflation. Interest rates, on the other hand, were not adjusted upwards sufficiently to 
compensate for the more rapid rate of inflation and became extremely negative in real 
terms. The financial system experienced, as a result, the major contraction described above. 
The Central Bank has also assumed the foreign-exchange risk associated with sub-
stantial inflows of foreign financial assistance for the targeted credit programs of the state-
owned banks. After the major devaluations of the 1980s, this has resulted in substantial 
losses for the Central Bank. Operational losses have been inflationary and have further 
complicated monetary management. 
The Central Bank has attempted to influence resource allocation through its redis-
counting programs, as well. These prograp1s have been accessible to the state-owned banks 
only, but not to the private banks. Indeed, the private banks have lacked any access to a 
lender of last resort, to deal with liquidity shortages. 
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The Central Bank has diverted considerable amounts of funds to the public sector 
through its reserve requirement policies, which have restricted the expansion of credit for 
the private sector and have allowed a greater volume of public-sector borrowing from the 
Central Bank and the state-owned banks. Numerous autonomous institutions ana state 
enterprises (particularly CODESA, and the Consejo Nacional de la Produccion, a price-
stabilization agency) have enjoyed automatic access to Central Bank funding. 
CODESA's access to Central Bank credit, which in 1983 represented one-half of all 
domestic credit for the public sector and 18 percent of all bank credit, was a major reason 
for the severe crowding out of the private sector in bank portfolios in the early 1980s. At 
the same time, in 1983 CODESA's enterprises contributed only 1.8 percent of the GDP and 
employed only 0.3 percent of the labor force. None of those public enterprises ever showed 
a profit.21 Recent Central Bank initiaties have finally excluded these institutions from 
access to Central Bank loans, but not to other sources of bank credit. 
VII. Institutional Evolution of the Nationalized Banks 
The decree that "nationalized" the private banks in 1948 had two main consequences 
on the structure of the Costa Rican banking system: 
(a) it created a legal monopoly in the mobilization of deposits from the public, in 
favor of the four state-owned banks, and 
21 Thelmo Vargas, "Viabilidad del Estado Empresario. El Caso de CODESA," San Jose: 
Unpublished report for USAID, 1987. 
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(b) it transformed the three expropriated private banks into public enterprises. 
Although the BNCR was already a public enterprise, it had been managed by profes-
sional bankers, with a considerable amount of independence from the Govern-
ment.22 After 1948, the BNCR experienced the same institutional changes· as the 
other three banks. 
The monopoly of deposit mobilization became a substantial restriction to entry into 
financial markets and sharply limited competition. It has been only recently, that the new 
dynamic private commercial banks have challenged the four state-owned institutions in the 
market for banking services. The transformation of the banks into state-owned enterprises 
modified, on the other hand, the objective function of their managers as well as the 
mechanisms for control over their decisions and actions. 
Five dimensions of the institutional evolution of the Costa Rican "nationalized" 
banking system are worth mentioning: 
(a) the gradual change in organizational culture, from state-owned banks that 
mimicked the private banks from which they had sprung, to labor-dominated bur-
eaucratic institutions; 
(b) the gradual change in the degree of autonomy from the Executive enjoyed by the 
state-owned banks, which led to an increasing political intrusion in credit allocation; 
(c) the changing role of the Central Bank and the recent deregulation attempts; 
22 Fernando Ortufio, El Monopolio Estatal de Ia Banca en Costa Rica, San Jose: Trejos 
Hermanos, 1963. 
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(d) the gradual emergence of evasion and avoidance mechanisms, which led to 
increasingly active non-regulated financial systems and to growing competition from 
the private banks; and 
(e) the transformation of the state-owned banks into borrower-dominated financial 
institutions, a source of services and important subsidies for borrowers, at the 
expense of depositors. 
The 1948 Junta had decided to keep the expropriated private banks as separate insti-
tutions, in order to avoid a concentration of power and to promote some competition. All 
the banks benefited from immediate capital contributions from the Government. A large 
transfer to the Banco Nacional, earmarked for subsidized, long-term agricultural credit, was 
the first of numerous and substantial fiscal and donor contributions aimed at increa~ing the 
availability of loanable funds for target populations and end uses. 
The Junta kept the old staff of the banks. The members of the boards of directors 
were asked to retain their positions, as well, and most did. Not much change in credit 
policies took place when the directors stayed. In practice, therefore, there had been a 
change of owner, but the banks continued to operate for some time as if they were private 
commercial banks. Highly respected professional bankers, who knew their clientele well, 
continued as managers for a long time and maintained a considerable independence from 
the political power. This was the case even for the BNCR. The 1950s and early 1960s were, 
therefore, the golden age for the "nationalized" banks, revitalized by the infusions of funds 
and by exceptionally rapid economic growth. 
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Gradually, however, the old bankers began to be replaced by politicians in the boards 
of directors and the management of the institutions. The directors were appointed by the 
Executive, for four-year periods, while the managers were appointed by the boards, for 
similar periods. Given the alternation of different political parties in the control' of the 
Executive and since one-half of the board was replaced every two years, each new adminis-
tration had to wait for two years before it controlled a majority of the board. This gave the 
banks considerable independence in those earlier years. 
In time, however, more and more the appointments became political rewards rather 
than reflecting an identification of a professional capacity in bank management. Appointed 
for only four years, the directors had little time and incentives to learn the complexities of 
banking and saw their position merely as an opportunity to advance their own political 
career.23 From their political rather than technical perspective, the new bank directors 
were open to the influence of the Executive and of their political party and vulnerable to 
the pressures from the private interest groups which they represented. Political intrusion 
and rent-seeking increasingly characterized their performance. 
After 1970, the independence of the banks further declined. According to the Consti-
tution, the four state-owned banks had become autonomous institutions. The Constitution 
originally defined "autonomy" as independence with respect to both policy and management. 
The purpose was to protect the technical operations of these institutions from political 
23 Jaime Solera, "Nacionalizaci6n Bancaria," in Ideario Costarricense. 1977. Banca. 
Moneda y Credito. San Jose: Casa Presidencial, Oficina de Informacion, 1977. 
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intrusion. In 1970 the Legislative approved a constitutional amendment, however, that re-
stricted the independence of the autonomous institutions to matters of management only. 
As a result, the banks have had to follow the directives of the Executive. 
An increasing politicization of the state-owned banks came also as a result of changes 
in the method of appointment of their boards of directors. After 1970, appointments were 
made at the beginning of each administration, four directors chosen from the winning party 
and three directors from the runner up (the 4-3 Law). An additional loss of independence 
took place in 1974, when a new law authorized the President to freely appoint and remove 
an Executive President for each autonomous institution, as its main executive officer. 
With the nationalization of the banks, the control over management exercised by the 
private shareholders disappeared. The banks were supposed not to pursue profit max-
imization any longer, but a set of criteria for the evaluation of their performance was never 
defined. The staff of the banks gradually filled the vacuum thus created.24 The number 
of employees at the banks increased from 686 in 1950 to 8,340 in 1986. This represented 
a rate of growth of employment at the banks twice as fast as for the economy as a whole. 
Labor unions of bank employees increasingly used their strength to improve their salaries 
and fringe benefits. Bank wages became higher than those for equivalent occupations in 
other sectors, while an important proportion of the banks' accounting profits was earmarked 
for employee fringe benefits (e.g., special pension plans). 
24 Eduardo Lizano, "Nacionalizaci6n Bancaria," in Ideario Costarricense. 1977. Banca. 
Moneda y Credito. San Jose: Casa Presidencial, Oficina de Informacion, 1977. 
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Rigid bureaucratic structures controlled by the labor unions severely restricted the 
adoption of staff promotion policies based on efficiency and of performance-linked incen-
tives to employees. Further organizational deficiencies described below, accentuated by this 
political economy environment, led the state-owned banks not to focus their institutional 
capacity to deal with risk in their lending decisions. This has been one of their major 
shortcomings and a formidable threat to their viability. 
Eventually, in the early 1980s substantial portions of their portfolio were already 
overdue. In 1983, the outstanding balances of loans with overdues of more than 90 days 
amounted to 24 percent of the state-owned banks total portfolio. The BNCR had the lowest 
ratio (21 percent), but still significant. By 1985, loans with more than 30 days overdues 
represented 33 percent of the portfolio of the four banks. The BNCR showed, by then, the 
highest proportion (36 percent). Of this, at the BNCR 8.2 percent of the portfolio was 
already being collected in the courts (cobro judicial).25 
Political intrusion in the state-owned banks had eventually resulted in high levels of 
repayment delinquency in their portfolios. Political influences further resulted in losses for 
these banks. In the late 1980s, severe droughts and reductions in the international prices 
of several export crops led to a "crisis" in the agricultural sector. Major lobbies obtained 
legislation to reschedule most of the delinquent agricultural loans at subsidized interest 
rates. 
25 Marco Antonio Gonzalez-Garita, "Eficiencia y Costos de Intermediaci6n Financiera: 
El Caso del Sistema Bancario Costarricense." San Jose: Unpublished report for USAID, 
1987. 
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The rescheduling legislation (FODEA), which mandated debt relief for delinquent 
agricultural borrowers, was enacted by unanimity in Congress. The implicit subsidy has been 
substantial and heavily concentrated in favor of a few large farmers. In the case of the 
Banco Nacional, of the 12,593 farmer with rescheduled loans in 1988, the bulk, 10,461 were 
smaller borrowers (with less than US$ 20,000 in total borrowing), but they accounted for 
only 26 percent of the amounts rescheduled. Another 1,508 farmers (with total borrowing 
between US$ 20,000 and US$ 70,000) accounted for 30 percent of the total amount delin-
quent, and 624 clients (with borrowings above US$ 70,000) were responsible for 44 percent 
of the arrears. 
Under the assumption of a rate of inflation of 20 percent per year during the 16 years 
of the rescheduling, the present value of the implicit subsidy amounted to US$ 20 million. 
With the rate of inflation at 40 percent, this subsidy would be equivalent to US$ 30 million. 
About five percent of the beneficiaries (the largest delinquent borrowers) will capture 
between 30 and 40 percent of this massive transfer of income.26 This has been one of the 
most impressive examples of the power of the rent-seeking interest groups within a "nation-
alized" banking system. 
26 Luis Mesalles, "Costa Rica: The Political Economy of Agricultural Credit," San Jose: 
Unpublished report for USAID under the Ohio State University project, 1988. 
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VIII. Costa Rica's Financial Reform 
Following the steps of many developing countries during the past decade, since 1984 
the Costa Rican authorities have implemented an ambitious financial reform. The reform 
has attempted to: 
(a) increase competition and reduce barriers to entry into financial markets; 
(b) augment the role of market forces (supply and demand) in the determination 
of interest rates and other prices of financial services; 
(c) augment the role of market forces in credit allocation decisions and in the 
determination of other terms and conditions of financial contracts; 
(d) improve the prudential supervision over the banking system; and 
(e) increase the independence of the Central Bank from political pressures. 
The background for the reform has been the comparatively successful stabilization 
program implemented since 1982. The relative price and exchange rate stability thus 
obtained has created an environment more favorable to financial intermediation than during 
the crisis, but not quite as propicious as during the earlier decades. The unified exchange 
rate, under the crawling-peg regime, has avoided major disequilibria in the foreign exchange 
market, but expectations about a rapid rate of devaluation have exerted upward pressure 
on real interest rates. Two-digit rates of price increases have reflected a moderate but 
continued use of the inflation tax which, coupled with high reserve requirements on bank 
deposits, have repressed financial activity. A substantial portion of the public's holdings of 
financial assets are still in foreign-currency deposits at the state-owned banks, while the 
crowding out of the private sector in domestic credit portfolios remains substantial. 
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Increased competition for the state-owned banks has come from the private commer-
cial banks, heavily supported by AID through specially-established rediscounting lines at the 
Central Bank. The private banks' share of the loan market increased from 0.3 percent in 
1978 to 15.3 percent of the National Banking System's portfolio in 1986. In 1989, new loans 
increased 71.4 percent at the private banks, 62.9 percent at the financieras, and only 11.3 
percent at the state-owned banks. 
One of the main consequences of the expansion of the private banks and the 
resulting increased level of competition in financial markets has been their impact on the 
behavior of the state-owned banks, including the BNCR. Major changes in structural 
organization and in the choice of financial technologies have taken place, under the 
leadership of new dynamic management. The state-owned banks' movement towards greater 
emphasis on their corporate banking services, and their new concern about financial 
viability, have led them, on the other hand, to question those activities where they lose 
- -
money. The dilemmas resulting from several conflicting objectives are forcing these banks 
to reconsider their role and redefine their policies and procedures, as described below for 
the BNCR. 
Since 1984, there has been a process of reduction of interest rate restrictions, leading 
to complete freedom in their determination five years later. Late in 1989, the Central Bank 
eliminated the last remaining restriction, which required the commercial banks to keep an 
intermediation margin of no more than 9 percentage points between their deposit and loan 
interest rates. 
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In addition, since 1987, the Ministry of Agriculture has budgeted resources to 
compensate the state-owned banks for the difference between the rate charged on subsidized 
small farmer loans and the rate paid on six-month deposits, while agreements with the 
World Bank, for the II Structural Adjustment Loan, and with AID, for their Development 
Assistance Program, have introduced ceilings on the total amount of subsidized credit that 
may be granted by the National Banking System. It is expected that the nominal, and 
therefore the real, value of the ceiling will gradually decline over the years. As a result of 
these reforms, most of the subsidized credit remaining in the System is associated with 
special international donor programs. 
In 1984 the Central Bank also initiated a gradual process of reform of the credit 
program, in order to transfer to the commercial banks full responsibility for credit alloca-
tion. From the topes de cartera, the Central Bank moved to the establishment of a few 
global limits on credit by sectors of economic activity. In 1987, the Central Bank set a 
maximum on the rate of growth of the credit portfolio, with no restrictions as to its composi-
tion. When in 1987 the share of "non-productive" loan uses rapidly increased in the banks' 
portfolio, political pressure was exerted by the Executive, and global ceilings on total credit 
and on "non-productive" credit balances were reintroduced in 1988 and 1989. All quantita-
tive credit restrictions have been eliminated in 1990. 
Increased independence for the Central Bank was achieved by changing the composi-
tion of its board of directors, where only the Minister of Finance remains as an ex officio 
member, and by eliminating the automatic access to Central Bank credit by several public 
sector agencies, such as the CNP. Prudential supervision has been substantially improved 
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under the responsibility of the new Auditoria General de Entidades Financieras, created by 
the 1988 Banking Law. 
IX. Agricultural Credit: From Success Stozy to Crisis 
Among developing countries, Costa Rica has enjoyed particularly favorable conditions 
for the progress of rural financial markets, including: 
(a) reasonably well-defined property rights and a legal framework for the enforce-
ment of contracts; 
(b) widespread land ownership, that has allowed mortgages to become a usable form 
of collateral; 
(c) small country size and an extensive development of roads, communications, and 
a bank branching infrastructure, that have contributed to a reduction of transaction 
costs; 
(d) substantial investments in human capital, resulting in an educated clientele and 
bank staff; and 
(e) political and institutional stability. 
With organization, infrastructure, and accessible information, success in the devel-
opment of rural financial markets as well as the viability of the institutions that serve them 
have been more likely. It is not surprising, therefore, that in many ways, for a long time 
Costa Rica had been a success story with respect to agricultural credit. 
The authorities had become interested in small-farmer credit issues as far back as 
1914, when the first state-owned bank, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica (today, the 
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Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) was created. At that time, the Cajas Rurales de Credito 
were organized, "to liberate small farmers from the usurious conditions of moneylender 
loans, and to stimulate production of basic grains for domestic consumption." 
Moreover, since the middle of the nineteenth century, the coffee beneficios h'ad oper-
ated, in effect, as small rural banks. Even today, loans from coffee processors and coopera-
tives represent an efficient credit delivery system that finances a substantial portion of the 
credit demand of thousands of coffee growers. 27 
When in 1936, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica was converted into the Banco 
Nacional de Costa Rica, the Cajas became the Juntas Rurales de Credito Agrfcola (rural 
boards for agricultural credit), and the concept of credit allocation by a board of local 
community members was maintained. Five board members evaluated their neighbors' 
creditworthiness on the bank's behalf and were responsible for loan collection. Indeed, in 
the earlier days, board members earned their commissions on the basis of the amounts of 
the loans collected.28 The two ingredients for success present in these arrangements were 
the utilization of locally available information in credit allocation decisions and the presence 
of strong incentives for loan collection. These ingredients were also present in the credit 
operations of the coffee beneficios. 
27 Gail Ann Morris, "An Economic Evaluation of Coffee Credit Delivery and Allocation 
in Costa Rica." University of Nebraska-Lincoln: Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Report No. 127, 1982. 
28 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Small Farmer Credit in Costa Rica: The Juntas Rurales," 
in Small Farmer Credit in Costa Rica, AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, Vol. II. 
Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, February, 1973. 
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In the 1940s the Juntas had already become a major instrument for the government's 
agricultural policies and by 1947 the number of new loans granted reached 12,641. Indeed, 
the success of the Juntas had preceeded the "nationalization" of the banks. In 1952, the 38 
Juntas in operation authorized 19,994 loans, provided technical assistance to farmers, and 
contributed to land purchases and the marketing of basic grains. Of the 157,146 loans 
granted by the Juntas between 1937 and 1952, only 36 had not been repaid. Of the 
accumulated loans for 122.6 million colones (equivalent to US$ 18 million) disbursed during 
the same period, default amounted to only 15,895 colones (US$ 2,390). This was a most 
impressive repayment record by any standards. It reflected the character of Costa Rican 
farmers, a tradition of respect for contracts and for legal institutions, and the credit-
worthiness evaluation practices of the local boards. 
In 1953, the Secci6n de Juntas Rurales de Credito Agricola was created at the Banco 
Nacional. This Secci6n was transformed into a Departamento in 1959. A member of the 
staff of the bank, the delegado, became the executive arm of the Junta. This was the begin-
ning of a process of centralization of rural credit administration and of diminishing authority 
of the local board, which has continued until today. In 1988, the Banco Nacional began the 
implementation of its new strategy of decentralization, by creating 10 regional offices, as 
discussed below. 
Starting in 1960, with a Chase Manhattan Bank loan, and in 1962, with a loan from 
the Development Loan Fund, substantial amounts of foreign resources have been used for 
small farmer credit programs at the BNCR. The allocation of domestically mobilized funds 
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for this purpose, on the other hand, soon stagnated, while the terms and conditions associat-
ed with the external funds were adopted as the norm for small farmer loan operations. 
Table 9.01 Costa Rica: National Banking System. Composition of 
Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Economic Activity 
(Percentages). 1950-1987. 
Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Agriculture 
40.1 
46.6 
43.9 
43.3 
43.6 
42.3 
39.9 
39.6 
37.7 
37.1 
37.5 
35.2 
34.6 
33.5 
33.9 
29.3 
26.0 
22.9 
20.7 
22.5 
23.8 
21.8 
22.1 
20.3 
21.2 
24.7 
27.5 
31.4 
31.4 
22.9 
20.9 
19.8 
Livestock 
13.7 
11.7 
13.4 
15.4 
16.6 
17.1 
17.7 
15.3 
15.6 
17.4 
18.4 
19.7 
21.4 
23.2 
23.2 
24.7 
26.1 
30.2 
27.3 
23.3 
22.7 
22.6 
21.4 
21.2 
21.8 
20.2 
22.6 
23.4 
23.0 
22.4 
19.5 
16.5 
Industry 
12.4 
10.4 
11.0 
11.8 
12.1 
13.8 
15.4 
15.4 
16.7 
17.5 
16.7 
18.1 
18.5 
19.5 
19.9 
17.8 
18.3 
21.7 
25.3 
25.7 
25.2 
26.0 
26.5 
24.7 
22.4 
22.3 
24.6 
26.6 
27.6 
32.4 
32.0 
31.6 
Other !!I 
33.8 
31.2 
31.7 
29.6 
27.7 
26.8 
27.0 
29.7 
30.0 
28.0 
27.4 
27.0 
25.5 
23.7 
23.0 
28.2 
29.6 
25.2 
26.7 
28.5 
28.3 
29.6 
30.0 
33.8 
34.6 
32.8 
25.2 
18.7 
18.0 
22.3 
27.6 
32.1 
!!I Includes: Commerce, electricity, services, housing, personal 
credit, credit to foreigners and unclassified credit. 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, Credito 
y Cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index. 
As a consequence of these institutional developments and of the generalized process 
of financial deepening experienced by the country, Costa Rican farmers have enjoyed a com-
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paratively ample access to credit. Crops and livestock received the lion's share, indeed, of 
the expansion of real bank credit portfolios through the mid-1970s. 
While in the early 1970s, it was estimated that only about 5 percent of all farmers in 
Africa and about 15 percent of those in Asia and Latin America had had access to insti-
tutionalloans, this proportion was over 30 percent in the case of Costa Rica.29 If bank 
credit delivered to coffee producers through the beneficios is included as formal credit, this 
proportion was close to an exceptionally high 45 percent in those days. 
Moreover, agriculture always enjoyed substantial shares of the total bank loan port-
folio. By 1960, while the average proportion of agricultural loans with respect to total 
domestic credit for the private sector was 22 percent among 18 Latin American countries, 
it was 60 percent for Costa Rica, the highest proportion in the Hernisphere.30 By 1973, 
these proportions were 24 percent for Latin America and 54 percent for Costa Rica.31 
Despite substantial structural transformation, by 1980 the share of agriculture in outstanding 
credit portfolios was 43 percent, more than twice the sector's contribution to the GDP. 
29 Gordon Donald, Credit for Small Farmers in Developing Countries. Boulder, Colora-
do: Westview Press, 1976. The World Bank, Bank Policy on Agricultural Credit. Washing-
ton, D.C.: The World Bank, 1974. 
30 Dale W Adams, "Agricultural Credit in Latin America: A Critical Review of External 
Funding Policy," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LIII:2, May, 1971, pp. 163-
172. 
31 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Las Polfticas de Tasas de In teres y la Asignaci6n del Cre-
dito Agropecuario por las Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo de America Latina," in 
Eduardo Sarmiento, ed. Polfticas de Tasas de Interes. Inflaci6n y Desarrollo en America 
Latina. Washington, D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1981. 
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Also, the share of crops and livestock in the annual flows of new loans was 46 percent at 
that time (see Tables 9.01 and 9.02 and Statistical Annex). 
Table 9.02 Costa Rica: National Banking System. Annual Real Rates 
of Growth of Credit Outstanding, by Sector of Eco-
nomic Activity. (Percentages). 1951-1987. 
Year Total Agriculture Livestock Industry 
1951 17.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1952 27.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1953 16.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1954 2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1955 8.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1956 12.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1957 18.3 37.4 1.5 0.1 
1958 4.3 -1.8 19.2 9.6 
1959 21.8 20.2 40.2 30.6 
1960 10.4 11.3 18.6 13.9 
1961 3.9 0.7 7.2 18.5 
1962 4.8 -1.0 8.7 16.5 
1963 20.8 19.8 4.4 20.6 
1964 13.7 8.1 16.1 23.8 
1965 13.2 11.4 25.8 18.5 
1966 -0.1 1.2 5.7 -4.8 
1967 2.2 -4.2 9.3 11.0 
1968 0.8 -1.0 9.6 3.0 
1969 1.6 -1.4 10.4 7.2 
1970 8.0 9.2 8.0 10.1 
1971 23.6 6.9 31.4 10.3 
1972 5.0 -6.8 10.9 8.2 
1973 -11.8 -22.3 2.1 4.2 
1974 3.1 -6.9 -6.7 20.2 
1975 17.3 27.6 -0.1 19.3 
1976 12.1 18.5 9.4 9.9 
1977 9.7 0.4 8.9 13.4 
1978 13.5 15.3 7.6 15.4 
1979 -3.4 -11.4 -4.4 -9.8 
1980 -5.7 -1.4 -2.8 -14.5 
1981 -49.5 -41.1 -53.3 -49.7 
1982 -22.5 -13.7 -13.0 -14.4 
1983 43.0 63.2 48.0 54.2 
1984 11.9 11.8 9.9 16.1 
1985 1.0 -26.5 -1.5 18.8 
1986 4.2 -4.6 -9.3 2.9 
1987 11.8 5.5 - 5.4 10.5 
Source: Computed from data in Banco Central de Costa Rica, credito 
y: Cuentas Monetarias, several years. Amounts deflated by the 
Wholesale Price Index. 
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Similarly, while between 1960 and 1973, while the ratio of agricultural credit to the 
value added in agriculture rose from 23 to 29 percent for Latin America as a whole, it 
increased from 62 to 73 percent for Costa Rica. This exceptionally high level of financing 
of agricultural activities continued during most of the 1970s. Moreover, through th'e mid-
1970s, loan delinquency rates were still low for agriculture, in general, and for small farmers, 
in particular.32 
During the 1980s, the regulated banking system of Costa Rica experienced a severe 
contraction and loanable funds became particularly scarce, as explained above. By the end 
of 1982, in real terms, the portfolio of outstanding bank loans to the private sector had de-
dined to about one-third of its 1978 value and it represented just over two-thirds of the 
value already reached by 1970. The real value of outstanding loans for crops (agricultura) 
and for livestock (ganaderfa) also declined, although proportionately less. By 1982, out-
standing loans for crops amounted to 44 percent of their 1978 real value, and outstanding 
loans for livestock, 38 percent. Investment credit suffered the most. 
Table 9.02 shows how, during the early stages of the crisis, agricultural credit suffered 
much, but proportionately less than the amounts of financing for other activities. This may 
have reflected, in part, the better performance of the agricultural sector during the worst 
years of the crisis, compared to the rest of the economy.33 The authorities channelled 
32 Robert C. Vogel, "Rural Financial Market Performance: Implications of Low Delin-
quency Rates," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LXIII:1, 1981, pp. 58-65. 
33 Victor Hugo Cespedes, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Ronulfo Jimenez, and Eduardo 
Lizano, Costa Rica: Estabilidad sin Crecimiento, San Jose: Academia de Centroamerica, 
1984. 
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funds towards this sector, as well, in view of its importance in terms of export earnings and 
food prices. As a consequence, the share of agriculture in the portfolio of credit outstanding 
grew from 41 percent in 1979 to 50 percent in 1982, while the share of the sector in the flow 
of new loans jumped from 37 percent in 1979 to 59 percent in 1982. Although the real 
value of the amounts disbursed was low, the proportion of agriculture in the portfolio 
increased sharply. 
An important recuperation of real credit values took place in 1983, once the ex-
change rate was stabilized and inflation was brought under control. That year, the flow of 
new loans for crops reached a historical maximum, even when measured in real terms. The 
proportion of the flow of new loans received by the sector was 57 percent, while the 
proportion of the portfolio of outstanding loans was 55 percent. The volumes of formal 
agricultural credit have declined afterwards. 
X. The Recent Credit Crunch 
After the sharp recovery of 1983, the agricultural credit volumes from the National 
Banking System declined for a couple of years, both in nominal and in real terms. These 
volumes increased in 1986, to decline again during the most recent years. The share of the 
portfolio of loans outstanding devoted to crops and livestock fell from the exceptionally high 
57 percent in 1983, to 37 percent of the total by the end of 1987. The share of credit for 
crops in the flow of new loans declined from 60 percent in 1983, to a historical low of 27 
percent in 1987. In addition, between 1983 and 1987, the share of livestock in the flow of 
new loans declined from 18 to 7 percent of the total. Similarly, the proportion of agricultur-
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alloans to the value added in that sector declined, as well. It appears, therefore, that agri-
culture, in general, and small farmers, in particular, have been recently suffering from a 
credit crunch. 
To the extent to which there may have been a change in the composition of the 
sources of loans for farmers, the recent smaller amounts of bank credit may have been offset 
by more credit from suppliers and other nonbank sources of loans. The Banco Internacional 
de Costa Rica and foreign banks became important sources of credit for coffee and sugar. 
Furthermore, to the extent that increased arrears and default represented loanable funds 
which were not returned to the banking system, but remained in the hands of the delinquent 
borrowers, the contraction may have been less than indicated by the figures reported here. 
Indeed, during the 1980s, the proportion of delinquent loans in the portfolios of the state-
owned banks increased to alarming levels, reflecting either the lack of ability or the absence 
of incentives for farmers to repay their loans, as well as the reduced willingness and/ or 
ability of the banks to collect those loans. This made those farmers not eligible for addi-
tional bank credit and reduced the flow of new loans for this sector. This situation was 
addressed by the FODEA legislation, described below. 
In some cases, the crisis as well as other changes in the external and domestic 
circumstances may have resulted in difficulties to repay. In many cases, however, the 
expectation that the interest rates attached to new loans would be higher, the fear to lose 
their position in the rationing queue, or the expectation of rescheduling options may have 
represented strong incentives for borrowers to delay repayment. The resulting high level 
of arrears and default not only reduced the effective volume of the loanable funds available 
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for new projects, but it seriously compromised the financial viability of the state-owned 
banks. 
The recent evolution of agricultural credit portfolios has reflected both demand and 
supply forces. There have been significant changes in the relative profitability of several 
sub-sectors. In some cases (particularly for rice), a lower profitability has been the result 
of deliberate policy decisions, in an effort to reduce the level of protection enjoyed by 
domestic producers. In other cases, profitability changes have reflected the evolution of 
international prices (sugar, beef). In the case of the new, non-traditional export crops, rapid 
growth in credit volumes has reflected their increasing profitability due to a real devaluation. 
All of this has resulted in shifts in portfolio composition, towards products in which Costa 
Rica possesses stronger comparative advantages. To the extent to which a structural 
adjustment program attempts to promote resource reallocations of this sort, such changes 
in credit portfolio composition are desirable and have increased economic efficiency. 
Higher real interest rates have reduced the demand for loans, as well. Less attractive 
uses of funds, many of them not necessarily for agricultural purposes, would have been 
discouraged. Again, this has been a desirable result of efficient financial intermediation. 
Concern about real rates of interest being too high, on the other hand, can be effectively 
addressed only through a reduction of the crowding-out effects associated with too large a 
public sector claim on domestic credit balances. 
A large reduction in agricultural credit flows has not been associated with a similar 
decline in the agricultural output. This suggests that, in the past, there might have been 
high levels of credit deviation and marginal substitutions of funds, in view of their fungibility. 
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Many of the now discouraged uses of funds would have been associated with non-agricultur-
al activities financed by "agricultural" credit. The elimination of the topes de cartera system 
would have reduced incentives for the state-owned banks to record a particular loan as 
"agricultural" credit, as well. On the other hand, partial deregulation would have created 
incentives for the banks to move away from subsidized credit activities, in an effort to 
increase their profits, in a more competitive environment. Eventually, a formal ceiling was 
placed on this type of credit. 
In order to investigate changes in the degree of access to credit, a survey of agricul-
tural producers was conducted by the Ohio State University-Academia de Centroamerica 
team in early 1988.34 The sample included 325 farmers, in three different regions of Costa 
Rica. 35 This survey confirmed the hypothesis of a comparatively high degree of farmer 
access to credit, in historical perspective. In the sample, 88 percent of the agricultural pro-
ducers had had loans, from any source, at least once during their lives. A high proportion 
(74 percent) had received loans, at least once, from a formal source, while 27 percent had 
34 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Ronulfo Jimenez, and Luis Mesalles. Costa Rica: Fuentes 
de Credito para los Agricultores. Columbus: Agricultural Finance Program, The Ohio State 
University, August, 1989. This study was sponsored by the Costa Rican Central Bank. 
35 The three regions were: (a) the South-West end of the Central Valley (Puriscal, 
Turrubares, San Mateo, and Orotina), a depressed region of traditional small farmers; (b) 
the North-West end of the Central Valley (San Ram6n, Palmares, Naranjo, and Alfaro 
Ruiz), a rich, export-oriented region; and, (c) the Santa Cruz, Nicoya, Nandayure, Hojancha 
corridor in Guanacaste, a basic-grain and livestock region that was suffering from a draught. 
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had loans from semiformal sources and 42 percent had borrowed from informal sources.36 
(See Graph 10.01) Both a high degree of access to credit and the importance of formal 
sources are unusual in comparison to other developing countries. 
Acce5s to agricultural credit in 1987, on the other hand, had been much less frequent. 
Only 56 percent of these agricultural producers had credit, from any source, during that 
year. This meant that 44 percent of the producers in the sample relied entirely on the self-
financing of their enterprises. The reduction in the degree of access to formal credit, 
compared to historical levels, was more pronounced still. Only 20 percent of the sample 
producers had access to formal loans during 1987, while 24 percent had access to semifor-
mal, and 27 percent borrowed from informal sources during that year. (See Graph 10.02) 
Less than 10 percent of the producers in the sample held a current account at a bank and 
no more than one-fifth possessed a passbook savings account. 
The survey showed that most of the loss of access to formal loans had taken place 
in the early 1980s, on occassion of the crisis, and that access had not been fully recovered 
afterwards. After 1983, on the other hand, there has been a substantial expansion of the 
semi-formal sources of loans, particularly from credit unions and coffee beneficios and 
cooperatives in the Central Valley. These intermediaries have offered better quality of 
services and have imposed lower transactions costs on their customers. 
36 The survey classified sources of credit into: (a) formal (regulated institutions, such as 
the state-owned and private banks, financieras, mutuales, and public agencies); (b) semifor-
mal (non-financial enterprises that grant credit, such as coffee beneficios and input suppliers, 
as well as credit unions and other cooperatives); and (c) informal (moneylenders, traders, 
friends and relatives). 
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Graph 10.01 
Access to Credit in Historical Perspective. 
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Proportion of the producers in the sample, that at some moment in their lives 
had access to different combinations of sources of credit, as well as those with 
no access. 
F: Formal Sources 
S: Semiformal Sources 
1: Informal Sources 
N: Not a Borrower 
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Graph 10.2 
Proportion of Agricultural Producers with 
Access to Credit in 1987 
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Proportion of the producers in the sample, with access to different combina-
tions of sources of credit, as well as those with no access to credit in 1987. 
F: Formal Sources 
S: Semiformal Sources 
1: Informal Sources 
N: Not a Borrower 
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Two-thirds of the producers interviewed had received loans from the Banco Nacional 
de Costa Rica at least once during their lives. This was true in all three regions covered by 
the survey and represented an outstanding achievement of coverage among any bank in a 
developing country. On the average, the customers of the BNCR had received tlieir first 
loan from this institution 17 years before (around 1970). They constituted, therefore, an old, 
established, well-known clientele. The condition of borrower is possibly transmitted from 
parents to children; at least two-fifths of the producers in the sample indicated that their 
parents had borrowed from the BNCR. 
Table 10.1 Costa Rica. Access to Credit during the Producer's Life and in 1987. 
Survey Results (proportion of farmers in percentages) 
Source Whole-life 1987 
Banco N acional 64.7 13.2 
Other Banks 49.6 6.5 
Coffee Beneficios 22.1 17.0 
Credit Unions 6.9 5.3 
Suppliers n.a. 4.4 
Money lenders 45.4 28.7 
On the average, however, these producers had received their last loan from the 
BNCR seven years before (around 1980), for an approximate duration of one decade for the 
bank-client relationship. With the crisis, an important proportion of an established clientele 
lost their traditional access to the BNCR. The number of new loans granted each year by 
the Departamento de Credito Rural declined from 24,284 in 1976 to 15,692 in 1980. This 
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number later increased to 19,076 in 1984, with the post-crisis recuperation, but declined to 
11,873 in 1987, the year of the survey. Thus, in 1987, only 13 percent of the producers in 
the sample received loans from the BNCR, compared to a whole-life 65 percent. (Table 
10.1) 
Among those with access to credit in 1987, the BNCR had granted 17 percent of the 
number of loans observed in the survey and 27 percent of the corresponding loan 
amounts.37 This bank's loans were larger than average and for terms longer than average. 
The average BNCR loan term was 24.7 months. The average interest rates charged by the 
BNCR (16.7 percent per year) were moderate (second lowest) within the range observed, 
from a 7.8 average for loans from local development associations, to a 46.6 percent average 
for itinerant traders.38 The BNCR borrowers had to wait 51 days, on the average, from 
application to first disbursement, and four visits to the bank were necessary. About one-fifth 
(22 percent) of the BNCR borrowers would have preferred that the funds were available for 
activities other than those formally financed. Cosigners were, by far, the most frequent form 
of collateral. 
37 When loan size was weighted by loan term, in order to get "effective loan balances," 
the BNCR granted 29 percent of the total. 
38 A comparison of interest rates does not make a contrast of the total cost of funds for 
borrowers possible, in view of the very different transactions costs associated with 
each source of credit. An average 60 days of loan approval procedures at the banks 
contrasted with less than two weeks at semi-formal sources. 
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XI. The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR) has been the most important state-
owned bank in the National Banking System. From all perspectives, it has been the largest 
bank in the country?9 It has operated the largest network of branches (its 139 agendas 
and sucursales accounted for 65 percent of the total for the National Banking System in the 
mid-1980s) and it has hired the largest banking staff (over 3,000 employees). 
The BNCR has also mobilized the largest volume of funds among all the banks. In 
1983-1985 it accounted for 44.1 percent of the equity capital, 43.7 percent of the liabilities, 
45.4 percent of the financial earnings, and 43.4 percent of the total expenses among the four 
state-owned banks.40 Table 11.01 shows its relative importance in early 1990, with respect 
to the four state-owned banks and with respect to all of the banks in the National Banking 
System. 
Table 11.01 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Relative Importance. 1990 
Assets 
liabilities 
Net worth 
Amount 
Billion colones 
96.985 
97.703 
5.282 
State-owned Banks 
% 
48.1 
48.2 
47.0 
System 
% 
41.6 
42.3 
31.3 
Source: Auditorfa General de Instituciones Financieras. La Naci6n, March, 1990. 
39 The BNCR is the largest banking institution in Central America and the Caribbean. 
Among the best banks in Latin America it was ranked 59th. (The Banker, October 
1987). 
40 Marco A. Gonzalez-Garita, "Eficiencia y Costos de Intermediaci6n Financiera: El 
Caso del Sistema Bancario Costarricense." San Jose: Unpublished report for USAID, 
1986. 
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Created in 1914 under the name of Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, it was re-
structured in 1936, under the name of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and it became part 
of the "nationalized" banks in 1948.41 In 1950, its Money Issuing Department 
(Departamento Emisor) was transformed into the Central Bank of Costa Rica. The'BNCR 
is an autonomous institution, with a Board of Directors appointed by the Executive. It 
enjoys independence in matters of management (administraci6n), but since the 1970 reform 
it has not been autonomous in matters of policy (gobierno ). It is at present organized into 
three large departments: Commercial, Mortgage, and Rural Credit. 
The Commercial Department mobilizes deposits from the public, borrows abroad and 
from international agencies, and receives funds from the Central Bank, including redis-
counting. It operates as a commercial bank and it possesses a Secci6n Financiera, that 
specializes in personal and consumer credit. The Mortgage Department issues mortgage 
bonds to fund its long-term lending operations. The BNCR is the only state-owned bank 
that possesses a Rural Credit Department, in charge of promoting agricultural credit and 
the social and economic welfare of small agricultural producers. The other three state-
owned banks operate an Office for Small Farmer Credit as part of their Commercial 
Departments. The Rural Credit Deparment is funded by special lines of credit from the 
Central Bank, loans from the Commercial Department, and international donor programs. 
It is interesting to notice that the IDB programs have been managed by the Commercial, 
not the Rural Credit Department, despite the fact that they have been justified as "small 
farmer" credit programs, as discussed below. 
41 The BNCR was the first state-owned bank created in Latin America. 
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XII. Organizational Structure of the Banco Nacional 
In the absence of effective competition, for a long time the BNCR adopted an 
inward-looking behavior, that was more concerned with procedures and regulations than 
with the quality of the services offered to its clientele. In an effort to minimize the risks of 
"making mistakes," innovation was systematically postponed by its managers and the 
emphasis placed on legal procedures. As a public enterprise, the BNCR has been subject, 
as well, to numerous legal limitations concerning purchasing and contracting, personnel 
hiring, and the level of its expenditures, that have made it a less agile agency than the 
private banks that began to offer it some competition in the 1980s. This competition has 
forced the state-owned banks to become more concerned about their viability. 
The organizational structure of the BNCR has been highly "bureaucratic;" there has 
been a lot of regimentation and of regulation, command chains have been very long, and 
the supervisors Gefacturas) have been very authoritarian. This is not unexpected in a public 
enterprise, but it has significantly diminished the institution's flexibility. This organizational 
structure has gradually begun to change in the most recent years, however, as will be 
discussed below.42 
The traditional organizational culture at the BNCR has been one that leads to little 
initiative and to a high degree of centralization. There has been very little delegation of 
authority. Communications, particularly between the regional offices and the headquarters 
(Oficina Central), have been difficult and have usually taken a lot of time. Supervisors have 
42 Alvaro Cedeiio, "Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Evaluaci6n Institucional," San Jose: 
Unmpublished report to the USAID, under the Ohio State University Project, 1988. 
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been very concerned with marginal dimensions of employee performance, such as personal 
appearance and punctuality~ since there have been no substantive goals for each job on the 
basis of which to evaluate performance. Indeed, measurement of performance has not been 
a part of management practices. In the absence of objective parameters, it has been difficult 
for supervisors to defend an unfavorable evaluation, and bad grades have been very 
infrequent. 
The organization's attention has focused on inputs and on procedures, not on outputs 
and on the amount and quality of services provided. As a consequence, the bank's produc-
tion processes have been fragmented and its customers have had to deal with separate 
offices for different types of service. Each worker's contribution to the bank's objectives has 
not been a criteron of evaluation. Effort, rather than outcome, has been the criterion. 
Another major managerial deficiency has been the absence of information about costs and 
about each unit's contribution to the bank's profits. This has prevented the use of transfer 
prices across departments and branches. 
While the best instrument that the BNCR has had in order to organize its actions 
around objectives and outcomes has been its annual budget, its preparation has been mostly 
an accounting exercise, rather than a management effort to indicate what will be done, a 
what cost, and with what expected results. Although, in recent years, department chiefs have 
been requested to produce an annual work plan, these plans have been more an explanation 
of what they do, rather than a list of outcomes to achieve. All of this has been a reflection 
of vague institutional objectives and of confusions between ends and means. 
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One of the institutional features that for a long time has precluded the adoption of 
measurement and evaluation as management practices has been the lack of mobility (tacit 
tenure) of the bank's employees. This has been mostly the de facto result of the complexity 
of the procedures (with strong union participation) to fire or to involuntarily move an 
employee to another position. Promotion has been mostly automatic, as a consequence of 
the passage of time. This has precluded any attempts to promote efficiency. Because of its 
public enterprise nature, the BNCR has not been authorized to offer monetary rewards for 
exceptional performance. This has been particularly constraining at the highest managerial 
levels. 
The limited qualifications of the staff at the supervisory levels (jefacturas) have 
represented an important institutional weakness. There are about 400 supervisory positions 
among the 3,380 employees of the BNCR, 246 in the regions and 154 at the bank's head-
quarters. In 1987, at the headquarters, 25 percent of the supervisors were professionals 
(with at least a licenciatura) and 25 percent possessed some other form of post-secundary-
school training (bachelor's degrees or technical diplomas). Most of these supervisors still 
adhere to the bank's traditional management style. 
XIII. BNCR Organizational Reforms 
The increasing competition from the private banks in the 1980s, as well as the 
liberalization policies adopted by the Central Bank since 1984, have forced the BNCR and 
the other state-owned banks to reconsider their role and organizational structure. Before, 
their concerns about viability had been minimal. At the BNCR, the new attitude has meant 
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a new view centered around the client, previously perceived merely as the user of a mo-
nopolic public service, and a new concern about outcomes. The dilemma between "public 
service" (practiced in the form of subsidized credit and a lenient attitude towards loan col-
lection) and "profits" has been magnified, rather than resolved. 
In November, 1987 the BNCR began a process of strategic planning that led to the 
initiation of a series of major organizational reforms at the bank. The process started with 
a workshop involving the 100 members of the bank's highest levels of its executive staff. 
The workshop made a preliminary identification of the institution's strengths and weakness-
es, of the threats and opportunities from recent changes in the environment, and of the key 
strategic issues. About a dozen teams (task forces) were then asked to carry out a diagnosis 
of the different revenue-generating activities of the bank. Strategic options to increase the 
institution's profitability and to improve the bank's competitiveness were then explored. The 
introduction of new and the elimination of old services followed, as well as major organiza-
tional reforms. The most important changes have taken place in the areas of strategic plan-
ning, automatization, marketing, regionalization, managerial control, and renewal of the 
supervisory staff. 
The bank's staff is not a homogeneous team. Rather, it is composed of several 
nuclei, with different inclinations towards innovation. Areas in which the BNCR has taken 
important steps in recent years have been the introduction of more sophisticated tools for 
funds mobilization, such as electronic transfers, automatic tellers, credit cards, and other 
services to enhance its current accounts. Other instruments have been introduced for a 
more dynamic funds mobilization. These have been the first steps away from a bias towards 
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credit that characterized the institution in the past. In mid-1987, the BNCR created a small 
"marketing unit," responsible to the General Manager, a sign of the bank's new orientation 
towards the client. This attention to marketing, the introduction of corporate banking 
practices, and the appointment of account officers have been mechanisms to alleviate the 
fragmentation of services that has characterized the 
activities of the institution. 
The management staff of the BNCR has been partially replaced. Four, rather than 
two, subgerencias have been created and filled with younger, dynamic professionals. Close 
to 100 supervisors have accepted offers for early retirement. They have been replaced with 
better trained staff. This has, in part, reflected the institution's major training efforts. 
These have included visits to banks abroad and numerous seminars and workshops. An 
important component has been the nine-month Banking Administration Program at IN CAE. 
Close to 200 BNCR employees have participated in this program. The impact of these 
INCAE alumni on the BNCR has been substantial. 
The BNCR has made progress in its major effort towards decentralization. The 
existing 22 sucursales, 58 agendas, and 48 cajas auxiliares have been organized in groups 
around 10 regional centers. Previously, there were three-member boards at each branch; 
now there will be a board for each regional center. Authority to approve loans has been 
increased at all levels. In the past, there was a large variety of branch organizational forms. 
The branch in Cartago was chosen as a "model branch" and its structure made uniform for 
others. 
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Atempts to measure performance have been associated with the Integrated Loan 
System, a computerized record of all the steps taken in processing a loan. By recording the 
dates on which the steps were completed, the bank has been able to measure the speed of 
the process, to detect delays, and to evaluate employee performance. In addition, tl1e bank 
has hired a consulting firm for the implementation of a cost accounting system. 
The BNCR considers as a first priority the introduction of computers, software, and 
other automatization tools. A new computer had been acquired in 1983 without the 
corresponding software. The BNCR hired programmers for the provision of software, but 
communication with the operations staff was poor, and the effort has been a failure. In 
October, 1987, after months of preparation, the bank attempted to computerize its current 
accounts, only to discover that the time required was more than the hours between the close 
of the previous day and the opening next day. 
XIV. Risk Management at the Banco Nacional 
The generalized impression among expert observers has been that the BNCR has not 
had a focused, institutionalized capacity to deal with risk, either in its (agricultural) credit 
decision making or in structuring its loan portfolio. Von Pischke has reported on various 
dimensions of this deficient risk management:43 
(a) Credit decisions for the larger agricultural and agroindustrialloans have been 
made through a series of clerical steps, executed by different organizational units, 
43 J.D. Von Pischke, "Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Risk and Portfolio Management," 
San Jose: Unpublished report to USAID under the Ohio State University project, 1988. 
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none of which has borne overall responsibility for loan quality. Instead, they have 
been only responsible for the completion of the step or steps that they have been 
required to execute. 
(b) For the smaller agricultural loans, including seasonal input credit, tlre loan 
amounts have been fixed according to avfos (representative farm budgets). These 
avfos have ignored the large credit-demand differences that exist among farmers, as 
well as their diverse risk characteristics. 
(c) Loans for most smallholder crops and livestock have been sized to cover 100 
percent ofthe costs of production associated with the inputs and technology implicitly 
recommended by the avfos, and including the costs of labor (much of it family labor), 
which have amounted to between 40 and 60 percent of total costs in many farm 
models. 
The financing of 100 percent of ideal technological practices, rather than credit 
geared to actual expenses, and the financing of family labor, which is a non-cash cost, 
have implied that credit has been frequently used as "political patronage," broadly de-
fined, and as a "social welfare" device. The risks associated with credit granted for 
these purposes have been much higher than it is desirable. The long-term investment 
loans of the IDB programs have covered at least 80 percent of estimated costs. The 
remaining 20 percent has been made up, moreover, of family labor and other forms 
of farmer participation that have not required cash outlays. 
(d) The BNCR has not kept adequate credit files. Loan documents and financial 
projections have been kept together in envelopes that are stored securely, but once 
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the loans have been paid off, the corresponding envelopes have been removed from 
secured storage and have been eventually disposed of. As a consequence, there has 
neither been a collected history of credit information on individual borrowers, nor 
procedures for the easy retrival of past credit performance information. Ihstead, 
these procedures have been consistent with a strategy of lending primarily for a 
project or for a purpose, rather than to a borrower. 
(e) Portfolio composition has been determined fundamentally by loan demand, as 
modified in the loan approval process, and by the programming guidelines implicit 
in the earlier tope system. It has not reflected portfolio diversification, in an effort 
to reduce portfolio risk. The IDB programs have targeted specific crops and activi-
ties, with no concern for risk reduction through diversification. 
(f) The loan approval process has not been significantly oriented towards risk, with 
three exceptions. First, borrowers presently in arrears have been subject to special 
scrutiny and can receive new credit only in conjunction with measures to bring the 
account current. This has promoted, however, the rescheduling of loans, with no 
special concern for the added risk. Second, the state-owned banks have exchanged 
some credit information among themselves, in an effort to ensure that the applicant 
is not already indebted elsewhere. Information on credit history has not been 
exchanged, however. As noted, the BNCR has not even kept credit history records 
for its own internal use. Third, the delegados (individual loan officers) may, but have 
not been necessarily required to screen applications with an eye to risk. Few have 
been so motivated by the existing incentives within the bank. 
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(g) The measures of loan recovery performance used by the BNCR have consisted 
of the volume of arrears and the volume of loans affected by arrears, the percentage 
of the portfolio in arrears and affected by arrears, and the ageing of arrears. 
Although these are useful measures for the valuation of a portfolio, comparisons of 
collections to amounts due, which are a better indicator of the effectiveness of collec-
tion procedures, have not been calculated. 
(h) Von Pischke believes that the BNCR's loan collection procedures have been 
administratively coherent. Furthermore, these procedures have been recently 
tightened, by reducing the periods between follow-up measures, such as sending 
notices, and taking legal action. Collection procedures cannot fully correct, neverthe-
less, for credit decisions that have not been oriented toward risk, or for the fragmen-
tation of responsibilities regarding the relationships of the bank with its borrowers. 
(i) Risk does not appear to have been a major factor motivating the recent organiza-
-
tiona! changes within the BNCR. There is a still a need for a better awareness of 
risk and for incentives to manage it, in order to respond rationally to risk. 
(j) With Central Bank prodding, the BNCR has begun to implement procedures for 
tracking portfolio quality, as a basis for establishing bad debt reserves. Appropriately 
expanded, these procedures could permit a better risk management as well as a 
strategic view of credit risk by the bank's managers. 
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XV. Loan Procedures at the Banco Nacional 
The BNCR's administrative procedures for loan evaluation and loan monitoring 
appear to have carried an excessive weight of documentation and of supervision, which has 
greatly added to the bank's operational costs. Graham has documented these excessive pro-
cedures:44 
(a) There has been an extensive amount of paperwork associated with the loan 
applications, reaching 14 separate forms for standard short-term loans at the Juntas 
Rurales, and as much as 25 pages and 8 detailed tables for the IDB loan documents. 
According to Graham, in 1988, handling of such paperwork, from loan application 
to disbursement, took from 3 to 4 weeks in the case of short-term loans and from 6 
to 8 weeks in the case of investment loans through the IDB program. 
(b) Much of this documentation has been concerned, among other things, with 
determining whether a farmer qualifies for a subsidized small-farmer loan, at a 15 
percent interest rate at the Junta Rural (or for some equivalent special program), or 
is elegible only for a commercial loan at the current interest rate (23 percent). In 
1988, the threshold gross income was 900,000 colones. In practice, the criteria have 
been uneven. Some delegados have apparently felt that they can estimate this 
threshold if they know the farmer's acreage, the crops grown, and the ruling market 
prices. Off-farm sources of household income have been ignored. Other delegados 
44 Douglas H. Graham, "Banco N acional de Costa Rica. Loan Procedures, Practices, and 
Performance." San Jose: Unpublished report for USAID under the Ohio State University 
project, 1988. 
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have used the amount of accumulated outstanding debt as a proxy for determining 
elegibility for the small-farmer program. The need to discriminate among potential 
borrowers in this fashion has added transactions costs for both the bank and the 
clients. 
(c) The heavy incidence of documentation has been particularly associated with the 
use of avfos (detailed farm budget models) in order to "determine" the total costs of 
production of the prospective borrower. The branches have been instructed not to 
lend more than the costs estimated in the avfo, but they would be able to lend less. 
In practice, however, the maximum allowed has become the norm, as very few 
delegados have approved less than the ceiling. This has been a reflection of the 
tendency to treat all borrowers equally and to avoid the hassle of differential treat-
ment, with the accompanying charges of favoritism. These practices, however, make 
it impossible to build differential levels of borrower self-financing into loan contracts 
and to use similar tools for risk management. 
XVI. Borrowing Costs for BNCR Clients 
Gonzalez-Garita measured the level and components of non-interest borrowing costs 
for Costa Rican farmers, from survey data for 394 clients of the Banco Nacional who 
borrowed, during 1983, from one of ten selected branches.45 Since many producers do not 
demand loans when the transaction costs are too high, the exclusion of potential borrowers 
45 Marco A. Gonzalez-Garita, "Farmer Borrowing Costs: The Case of Costa Rica," 
Master's Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1986. 
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from market participation because of too high costs was not observed by this survey of bor-
rowers. Similarly, long distances and limited access, due to the absence of roads or their 
poor condition, prevented the completion of some of the interviews in the sample. These 
clients do incur in high transaction costs, precisely for the same reasons. As a consequence, 
Gonzalez-Garita underestimated farmer borrowing costs. 
A detailed questionnaire measured fees and commissions, taxes and document costs, 
and travel expenses (weighted in the case of multipurpose trips). The interviews also 
generated information to impute the opportunity cost of the time of the borrowers and of 
those acting on their behalf. For these purposes, the minimum wage in agriculture was 
used, which underestimated true time costs. 
The average level of the non-interest costs of borrowing was high, as shown in Table 
16.01. It amounted to 6.8 percent of loan size and, when adjusted for loan term, it was 
equivalent to 11.5 percent per year. Since average interest rates were 13.6 percent, the total 
cost of the funds was at least 25 percent per year. This high level was surprising, given the 
small size of the country, the extension of the network of roads and bank branches, and the 
development objectives of the state-owned banks. 
On the average, therefore, interest payments represented 54 percent of the total cost 
of the funds. In the case of smaller borrowers (less than US$ 200), interest accounted for 
only 25 percent of total borrowing costs, while for larger borrowers (US$ 10,000 and over) 
interest accounted for 86 percent of these costs. More notable was the dispersion of the 
non-interest borrowing costs. While interest rates ranged between 8 and 30 percent per 
year, non-interest costs ranged between 0.2 and 117.5 percent per year. The total cost of 
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the funds ranged between 10.8 and 129.5 percent per year, compared to an annual rate of 
inflation of 26 percent. There was a four-fold difference among interest rates and a 600-fold 
difference among the non-interest costs of borrowing. 
Non-interest borrowing costs per colon declined rapidly with loan size, from 37 
percent for loans of less than US$ 200, to 2.8 percent for loans above US$ 2,000. The 
existence of the trade-off between the interest and non-interest costs of borrowing was 
confirmed. Under-equilibrium interest rates generated excess demands for credit that 
required strict rationing criteria (more complex procedures, additional steps, and waiting) 
and thereby increased borrowing costs. The strict end-use targeting for the funds, super-
vision, and eligibility requirements also increased borrowing costs. 
Borrowing costs were higher in the case of small, basic-grain producers than for 
export-oriented farmers. These costs were also higher when the collateral was a cosigner 
rather than a mortgage. The positive elasticity of borrowing costs with respect to distance 
suggested the potential social gains from a further geographical expansion of the branch 
network and from a reduction of the required number of trips to the branch. The 394 
borrowers interviewed made 3,675 trips to the branches, with a total duration of 14,700 
working hours. This represented an average of 4.5 full working days for each client, usually 
at the time of planting. The average number of trips was 9.3 per borrower, and it ranged 
between 1 and 19 trips per loan. Borrowing costs were higher for those clients with previous 
delinquency records and lower for those who were also depositors in the bank. 
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Table 16.01. Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Interest and Non-Interest Farmers' 
Borrowing Cost (Percentages) 1983. 
Interest Average Annualized Cost of 
Rate Cost Av. Cost Funds 
Loan Size 
Less than 10,000 12.2 22.5 37.1 49.3 
10,001 to 50,000. 12.5 6.9 12.6 25.1 
50,001 to 100,000 13.4 2.9 4.4 17.8 
100,001 to 500,000 15.6 2.4 2.8 18.4 
More than 500,000 20.1 2.9 3.4 23.5 
End Use of the Loan 
Export Crops 15.6 4.9 5.2 20.8 
Basic Grains 12.7 11.5 26.0 38.8 
Other Crops 12.1 5.1 8.1 20.2 
Livestock 15.8 6.8 7.0 22.9 
Interest Rate 
Less than 12% 12.0 7.7 13.7 25.7 
15% 15.0 3.8 3.9 18.9 
18-29% 18.4 4.4 4.4 22.8 
22-26.5% 23.2 3.3 4.5 27.7 
DeJ2artment 
Commercial 18.1 3.7 4.2 22.2 
Rural 12.0 7.9 13.9 26.0 
Educational Level 
No Education 12.8 12.1 19.4 32.2 
Primary School 13.1 8.8 15.4 28.1 
High School 14.0 4.5 5.7 19.7 
University 17.3 3.0 3.7 21.0 
Default Record 
Yes 13.7 8.1 14.5 25.3 
No 12.8 6.1 10.0 23.9 
Checking Account 
Yes 17.8 3.3 3.9 21.7 
No 12.7 7.5 13.0 25.7 
Savings Account 
Yes 14.1 4.0 5.5 19.6 
No 13.4 7.7 13.4 26.8 
Source: Gonzalez-Garita (1986). 
XVII. Intermediation Costs and Bank Profitability 
The private banks were nationalized explicitly to eliminate the profit-maximization 
motive from their objective function. Over the years the banks have earned, indeed, a 
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minuscule rate of return on their capital, even after accrued interest not actually received 
on delinquent loans has been included as part of their accounting earnings. 
When losses due to defaulted loans are considered, they have incurred in substantial 
losses most of the time. As a result, in real terms their capital declined by 54· percent 
between 1966 and 1976 and by an additional 57 percent between 1976 and 1983. By 1985, 
in real terms the accounting capital and reserves of the state-owned banks represented only 
60 percent of their 1966 level. If defaulted loans were written off, the reduction in capital 
would be even greater. 
These losses, moreover, have not been due to comparatively narrow financial 
margins. On the contrary, they have reflected extremely high intermediation costs in the 
presence of wide bank margins. When these costs are added to those imposed on depositors 
and borrowers, it is clear that the nationalization of the banks has required a substantial use 
of resources for the completion of financial transactions. This has been a waste that the 
country could ill afford. 
As shown in Table 17.01, in 1985 non-financial intermediation costs at the BNCR 
represented 6.3 percent of the effective volume of funds mobilized, net of reserve require-
ments.46 When accrued interest not effectively earned was added, the gross margin re-
quired for zero profits was 10.2 percent of the effective mobilization. Deposit-mobilization 
costs represented 2.2 percent and lending costs 4.1 percent of effective mobilization. The 
bank earned 18.3 percent as accrued interest on its loans and investments and paid 10.3 
46 Marco A. Gonzalez-Garita, "Eficiencia y Costos de Intermediacion Financiera: El 
Caso del Sistema Bancario costarricense," San Jose: Unpublished report to USAID, 
1986. 
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percent on the funds mobilized. This left the bank with a margin of 8.0 percentage points 
to cover intermediation costs and losses due to default. Transaction costs of 10.2 percent 
resulted, therefore, in a loss of 2.1 percent as a proportion of effective mobilization.47 
When the reserves against default, depreciation, and staff layoff payments are added, the 
losses amounted to 4.4 percent of the total mobilization of funds. 
47 Minor Sagot, in "Financial Intermediation in Costa Rica: Status and Prospects," San 
Jose: Unpublished USAID report, 1985, claimed that the difference between the 
average loan and deposit interest rates at the state-owned banks was 11.3 percent, 
compared to 3.9 percent at the private banks. 
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Table 17.01 Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Financial 
Intermediation Costs (Million CR$). Revenues and 
Costs as a proportion of Effective Funds Mobilization 
(Percentages). 1985. 
Total Mobilization 
Actual Reserves 
!!I 
h/ 
Effective Mobilization 
Interest and Commissions Accrued 
Non-Financial Lending Cost 
Expected Net Lending Revenue 
Defaulted Interest 
Effective Net Lending Revenue 
Interest and Commissions Paid 
Non-Financial Mobilization Cost 
Total Mobilization Cost 
Gross Effective Profits Q/ 
Reserve Against Default 
Depreciation Reserve 
Layoff Reserve 
Net Effective Profits after Reserves 
Expected Intermediation Margin 
Effective Intermediation Margin 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs 
Total Non-Financial Transaction Costs 
plus Defaulted Interest 
AMOUNT 
23,746.3 
3,640.7 
20,105.7 
======== 
3,685.3 
833.2 
--------
2,852.0 
769.0 
--------
2,083.1 
======== 
2,062.8 
441.4 
--------
2,504.2 
======== 
(421.1) 
425.0 
21.2 
27.4 
--------
(894.7) 
======== 
1,622.5 
853.5 
1,274.6 
2,043.5 
PERCENTAGE 
100.0 
15.3 
84.7 
======== 
18.3 
4.1 
--------
14.2 
3.8 
--------
10.4 
======== 
10.3 
2.2 
--------
12.5 
======== 
(2.1) 
2.1 
0.1 
0.1 
--------
(4.4) 
======== 
8.1 
4.2 
6.3 
10.2 
g_f Average of outstanding daily balances of all funds mobilized 
(Deposits from the public, Bonds placed with the public, Loans 
and Rediscounts from the Central Banks, and Foreign Loans). 
'Q/ Average daily balances of actual reserves held by the bank. 
Q/ Effective net lending revenue - Total mobilization costs. 
Source: Gonzalez-Garita (1986). 
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XVIII. The IDB Programs: Terms and Conditions 
The terms and conditions of the IDB loans for the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
have changed over time, in response to modifications in the environment and as a conse-
quence of earlier experiences. Change has in general been slow, however, with other 
agencies taking the initiative for innovation. This evolution is examined here by comparing 
the terms and conditions associated with loan number 507 /SF-CR of 1977 (known as the 
IDB's Fourth Stage of the Agricultural Credit Program at the BNCR) and loan number 
497 /OC-CR of 1985 (known as the Seventh Stage). 
(1) Borrower. Guarantor. and Executing Agency 
In 1977, as had been the case with earlier loans, the BNCR was the executing agency 
as well as the actual borrower, in its capacity as an autonomous public entity, while the 
Republic of Costa Rica (Central Government) served as the guarantor. In 1985, while the 
BNCR was still the executing agency, the Central Bank of Costa Rica was the borrower and 
guarantor, a practice that had been adopted in 1981. The foreign exchange risk was ex-
clusively assumed by the Central Bank, which charged two percentage points for this service. 
This change of borrower reflected the centralization of all public foreign borrowing 
transactions by the Central Bank, as a consequence of the debt crisis of the early 1980s. 
While this procedure protected the BNCR, not saddled by the foreign exchange risk during 
a period of macroeconomic instability, and thus able to charge the final beneficiaries interest 
rates that did not incorporate this component, it introduced another layer of transactions 
costs in loan administration (the Central Bank) and it represented an implicit subsidy for 
the final beneficiaries. The Central Bank was asked to perform a "development" rather than 
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a typical monetary function, while the eventual foreign exchange losses added to the Bank's 
operation losses, to inflationary pressures, and to the recent difficulties in macroeconomic 
management. 
The Central Bank was required to make the loan resources available to the 'BNCR 
under a transfer agreement, on conditions substantially similar to those approved by the 
IDB. With the Central Bank as the actual borrower, a debated question has been the 
BNCR's "monopolistic" access to the IDB funds. Several have argued that these funds 
should have been made available to all of the banks in the National Banking System, as has 
been the case with other donor programs. Competition among the banks for these funds 
would have increased the quality of services to the final client and the efficiency of loan 
administration. It has been claimed that the BNCR, on the other hand, possesses both the 
infrastructure of branches and the vocation towards the agricultural sector to guarantee a 
wider coverage of the pool of potential small and medium farmer borrowers that represent-
ed the program's target clientele. 
(2) Beneficiaries 
As in the earlier loans, the 1977 program was targeted to agricultural producers and 
cooperatives, "confining its sphere of action exclusively to the level of small producers."48 
The requirements to be met by the beneficiaries were: 
(a) they must be located in the national territory; 
48 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: Agriculture and Livestock Credit 
Program for Small Producers and Cooperatives. Project Report." Washington, D.C.: PR-
800-A, 5 May, 1977, p.l. 
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(b) agricultural activities must be their principal source of income; 
(c) they must be engaged personally and directly in such activities; 
(d) they must be good administrators; 
(e) the total assets of individual small farmers may not exceed the equivalent 'of US$ 
60,000 for those in crops and US$ 120,000 for those in livestock; 
(f) not less than 80 percent of a cooperative's members must meet the requirements 
for the individual beneficiaries; and 
(g) not less than 60 percent of the volume of production handled by a cooperative 
must be produced by its members. 
The IDB program thus employed a less restrictive definition of "small producer" than 
that adopted by the BNCR for its Rural Credit Department operations, limited to borrowers 
with gross annual incomes under US$ 6,000. The Rural Credit Department accounted for 
60 percent (over 50,000) of the number of loans made by the BNCR in 1976, but disbursed 
only 12 percent (about US$ 41 million) of the bank's total portfolio. About 65 percent of 
the Rural Credit Department operations were at that time financed by special lines of credit 
from the Central Bank and by the USAID. In contrast with these Juntas Rurales loans, the 
IDB program transactions have been large, and the IDB credit programs have been 
perceived by Costa Ricans as "medium-size borrower activities." The IDB limits were also 
higher than those established by the World Bank for small producers in their agricultural 
development program of 1976. 
The IDB indicated its unwillingness to work with the Rural Credit Department by 
arguing that "it experienced high levels of delinquency" and that "the interest rate charged 
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to the final beneficiaries (8 percent) is negative, by virtue of the high operating costs of 
administering a large number of smallloans.'149 Loans from the Rural Credit Department 
had an average size of US$ 800 and operating costs were estimated to amount to close to 
10 percent of loan size. 
Contrary to popular opinion, however, the levels of delinquency experienced by the 
Rural Credit Department have been much lower than elsewhere in the BNCR. ·As recent 
experience has shown, the default problem has been much more acute with respect to the 
larger borrowers of the Commercial Department (including those in the IDB programs). 
The high operating costs of the Rural Credit Deparment, on the other hand, were 
due in large part to small loan size, despite the fact the procedures were simpler and more 
expeditious than elsewhere in the bank. The IDB program procedures, on the contrary, 
have been heavy and costly, even for loans of much larger size. Since it was clear that the 
costs to both the bank and the customers of applying these procedures to really small loans 
would have been prohibitive, this might have been the dominant consideration in excluding 
the Rural Credit Department from this "small producer" program. 
Data from the 1973 Agricultural Census, available at that time, indicated that most 
farms in Costa Rica belonged to comparatively small holders. Indeed, 93 percent of the 
77,000 existing farms were of less than 100 hectares in size. The Project Report claimed 
that the asset ceiling for elegibility corresponded to farms of a maximum area of 67 hec-
49 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: Agriculture and Livestock Credit 
Program for Small Producers and Cooperatives. Project Report.'' Washington, D.C.: PR-
800-A, 5 May, 1977, p. 39. Note that negative here refers to the interest rates not being 
sufficient to cover loan administration costs, rather than to a comparison with inflation rates. 
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tares.50 The expected number of beneficiaries (about 1,000) thus represented less than 4 
percent of the eligible producers. This, of course, guaranteed sufficient demand for the IDB 
funds. The earlier program (323/SF-CR) had involved 952 loans. 
While for the 1985 loan the IDB used ordinary capital resources, not restr:i'ctive as 
regards beneficiary characteristics, the BNCR decided to limit the subloans to producers 
whose total assets did not exceed US$ 200,000 (small and medium-scale farmers). This 
restriction still introduced additional transactions costs into the procedure, given the usually 
difficult, and not very accurate, valuation of a customer's total assets. In addition, the 
beneficiaries were expected to accept the program's technical recommendations. The Crop 
Development subprogram was expected to reach 1,065 farmers, while the Livestock Devel-
opment subprogram was expected to reach 775 producers. 
(3) Loan size 
In the 1977 program, maximum loan size to an individual beneficiary was set at US$ 
30,000 in the case of crops and US$ 60,000 in the case of livestock operations. For agricul-
tural cooperatives and associations, the ceiling was US$ 200,000. As already discussed, these 
were comparatively high limits and made the IDB loans attractive for comparatively 
prosperous farmers and ranchers. 
In the 1985 program, the ceiling on individual loans was set at US$ 75,000 and on 
cooperative loans at US$ 400,000. No arbitrary distinction was made between crop and 
livestock loans any more. On the other hand, the BNCR was advised by the IDB not to 
50 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: Agriculture and Livestock Credit 
Program for Small Producers and Cooperatives. Project Report." Washington, D.C.: PR-
800-A, 5 May, 1977, p. 15. 
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approve operations for amounts of less than US$ 1,500. The loan amounts to be granted 
were expected to cover no more than 85 percent of the cost of the investments, but permis-
sion was given to fund 100 percent of the value of the investment in the case of "low-
income" farmers. The disadvantages of financing a relatively large proportion' of the 
farmer's investment and the incentives for default (moral hazard) that this introduces have 
been discussed above. 
(4) Loan Terms and Interest Rates 
For the 1977 loan, the IDB charged the BNCR a 2 percent per year interest rate, 
with an amortization period of 20 years, including a four-year grace period. The loan was 
also subject to a credit commission of 0.5 percent per year on the undisbursed portion in 
foreign exchange and a one percent commission on the total for IDB inspection and super-
vision. The period for the total commitment of the funds by the BNCR was set at three 
years, and the period for total disbursement at four years. These terms exerted moderate 
pressures for the quick disbursement of the funds by the BNCR. 
For the 1985 loan, the IDB charged the Central Bank a variable interest rate, which 
at the time of the agreement was 9.5 percent per year. This reflected major changes in in-
ternacional financial markets since the late 1970s. The Central Bank would charge the 
BNCR, in turn, two additional percentage points. The corresponding credit commission was 
1.25 percent on undisbursed balances, while the inspection and supervision commission 
remained at one percent of the total loan amount. The amortization period was 20 years, 
with a five-year grace period. The period for the commitment of the funds was three years, 
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and the period for disbursement four years, except for the last US$ 600,000 to be disbursed 
during the fifth year. 
Under the 1977 program, on the other hand, the BNCR was authorized to make 
loans to farmers for up to 14 years, including grace periods of up to four years.· Loans 
would be "subject to the annual interest rates established by the Central Bank of Costa Rica 
for the beneficiaries of the program." At the time of the agreement those rates ranged 
between 8 and 12 percent per year, for several categories of expenditures. No special 
requirements were introduced for the real interest rates to be positive and, as inflation 
accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rates charged to the subborrowers became 
highly negative in real terms. This had already happened during the implementation of loan 
323/SF-CR (1972-1976). The program beneficiaries had been charged 8 percent per year 
interest and a two percent control commission until September, 1974, when the BNCR 
began to charge 9 percent interest with no other financial charges. That year, however, the 
rate of inflation was above 40 percent. 
Under the 1985 program, the BNCR was authorized to charge the "current interest 
rate, as established by the Central Bank." It was stipulated that the IDB, the Central Bank, 
and the BNCR would periodically review the interest rates to be charged to the beneficia-
ries. "The BNCR would onlend the funds at annual rates of 15 and 18 percent to small and 
medium-scale beneficiaries; these rates are positive and more than cover the expenses of 
the BNCR." The effective weighted interest rate that the BNCR would receive, after taking 
into account idle time that does not produce any return, was estimated at 15.54 percent. 
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This was assumed to allow the BNCR to cover financial and administration costs, estimated 
at 13.59 percent (!) and to obtain a differential (profit) of 1.59 percent for capitalization.51 
Compared to the 1977 loan, the 1985 program recognized the need to keep real in-
terest rates positive and estipulated a periodic review of the rates to be charged 'to the 
beneficiaries. By keeping these loan rates constant at the 15 and 18 percent level, however, 
real interest rates were allowed to become negative during some years. Furthermore, with 
an effective rate of 15.54 percent and financial costs at 11 percent, the BNCR was expected 
to enjoy a financial margin of only 4.54 percentage points, to cover administration costs, 
reserves for losses from default, and earn a profit. The estimated 2.59 percent for adminis-
tration costs and losses from default was clearly insufficient and the whole margin might not 
have been enough, given the complexity of the procedures associated with the IDB pro-
grams, including the provision of technical assistance to the borrowers, and the recent 
experience with arrears and default. No explicit efforts were made to measure these 
transaction costs for the BNCR or to adjust the provisions for delinquent loans to more 
realistic levels, in view of the information already available. 
XIX. The IDB Programs: Main Features 
Two prominent features of the IDB programs have been the supply of long-term in-
vestment credit and their emphasis on the provision of technical assistance to the borrowers. 
In the second-half of the 1980s, the IDB funds at the BNCR were possibly the most 
51 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: VII Agricultural Credit Program," 
Washington, D.C.: CR-0109, November, 1984, p. 18. Notice the incredible degree 
of "precision" attempted with those double-decimal figures. 
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important (if not the only) source of long-term funds for investment in agriculture available 
throughout the banking system. This has most likely been the most important contribution 
of the IDB loans to growth in the agricultural sector. The strong emphasis on technical 
assistance, on the other hand, has raised serious questions about program costs and effec-
tiveness. These questions, briefly discussed in this section, have hardly been resolved. 
(1) Program Size 
While the IDB loan amount had been US$ 10 million in 1977, disbursed both in for-
eign currencies and in colones, it was US$ 35 million in 1985, in foreign currencies only, and 
in reflection of the increasing importance of the IDB programs for the BNCR. The total 
cost of the programs, including the local counterpart, had been estimated at US$ 14.4 
million in 1977 and was US$ 54 million in 1985, with the IDB contributing about two-thirds 
of the total funds in each case. The 1985 program was expected to represent about 4 
percent of the agricultural credit portfolio of the National Banking System (with the IDB 
funds accounting for 2.5 percent of the total) during the years of disbursement. 
Over the years, the relative importance of the IDB programs at the BNCR has been 
substantial and growing. Towards the end of 1989, the IDB programs portfolio represented 
about one-fifth of the total bank's portfolio and about two-fifths of the institution's agricul-
tural portfolio, as shown in Table 19.01. Inevitably, a contribution of this size has had a 
considerable impact on the institution's performance and procedures. 
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Table 19.01. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Relative Importance of the IDB 
Programs, September 30, 1989. (Millon colones). 
Total BNCR IDB Programs % 
Crops 6,938 2,690 38.8 
Livestock 4,639 1,763 37.4 
Agriculture 11,577 4,426 38.2 
Total Portfolio 21,872 20.2 
(2) Loan Uses 
Earlier programs had been heavily concentrated in livestock loans. In 1977, however, 
there had been a reduction in the import quota of beef into the United States and a drop 
of world beef prices. Thus, the 1977 program for the first time focused on domestic food 
crops (basic grains and oil seeds as well as dairy cattle and swine raising) rather than live-
stock (beef). The 1985 program, on the other hand, explicitly included two subprograms 
(Crop Development, for US$ 32.7 million, and Livestock Development, for US$ 20.9 mil-
lion) as well as a technical cooperation for the institutional strengthening of the BNCR (for 
US$ 240,000, of which US$ 130,000 were IDB funds). Special emphasis was placed on non-
traditional export crops. In this way, the IDB programs responded to the agricultural 
development strategies of the different Administrations at the time of each loan's negotia-
tions. 
Under the 1977 program, the BNCR was to make loans for fixed investments (build-
ings and permanent crops), for the purchase of breeding stock, and for the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment. Provisions were also made for short-term loans to cover annual 
outlays for planting, technical inputs, cultivation, and harvesting, and to finance annual crops 
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when a larger output was required. In an evaluation of loan 323/SF-CR, the 1977 Mission 
had already discussed the problems caused by the requirement that goods be purchased 
from elegible countries. The report indicated how, "despite the efforts to promote the 
purchase of machinery, it was not possible to arouse the interest required, since the program 
involved small and medium livestock producers who in general needed very little machinery 
coming from eligible countries."52 
It has been expected that a larger proportion of the funds available under the 1985 
program would be used for investment (76 percent, as compared to 42 percent for the 1981 
program: VI stage). About 90 percent of these investment funds would be used, however, 
primarily to finance the establishment and maintenance of permanent crops until the start 
of production. The demand for imported machinery has been expected to be small. 
Although all agricultural categories not expressely excluded by the IDB were elegible, 
preference was given in 1977 to basic grains, dairy cattle, and swine raising. The 1985 pro-
gram was expected, in turn, to promote non-traditional export crops. Lines were identified 
for permanent and semi-permanent crops (cocoa, macadamia nuts, sugar cane, rattan, 
flowers and ornamental plants, fruits and citrus); for livestock development (beef and dairy); 
and for the development of tertiary irrigation infrastructure (Tempisque ). 
52 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: Agriculture and Livestock Credit 
Program for Small Producers and Cooperatives. Project Report," Washington, D.C.: PR-
800-A, May 5, 1977, p. 17. 
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(3) Estimation of the Demand for Credit 
In 1977, the aggregate demand for credit was estimated "on the assumption that 
financing needs would have to grow to keep pace with the physical volume of sectoral 
production, which was projected at 5 percent per annum, while prices were expected to grow 
another 5 percent."53 It was also assumed that small farmers would continue to receive 20 
percent of the agricultural credit projected, for a total of US$ 28 million. With US$ 7.3 
million available from the World Bank, the IDB program's US$ 13.8 percent were expected 
to be below the "projected needs." While an exercise of this kind might have been neces-
sary to convince the IDB Board that there was sufficient demand for the funds and that 
disbursement would not be delayed, there has been little further use for these estimations. 
They certainly did not represent, in any fashion, an estimation of a demand for credit, nor 
could such an estimation have been easily accomplished. 
The 1985 IDB Mission correctly indicated, on the other hand, that "the relationship 
between the program and the global demand for agricultural credit cannot be estab-
lished."54 The main reason was the presence of an underequilibrium interest rate that 
resulted in an excess demand for credit, whose magnitude would be very difficult to deter-
mine. Rather, on the basis of microeconomic considerations about the existence of feasible 
projects, the Mission attempted to justify the program. Obviously, the absence of any 
53 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: Agriculture and Livestock Credit 
Program for Small Producers and Cooperatives. Project Report." Washington, D.C.: PR-
800-A, 5 May, 1977, p. 14. 
54 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: VII Agricultural Credit Program," 
Washington, D.C.: CR-0109, November, 1984, p. 11. 
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difficulties in disbursing all previous IDB loans could easily be considered as sufficient 
evidence that the new funds would be demanded, particularly in view of the credit crunch 
of the late 1980s, discussed above. 
For the 1977 loan, the computation of the total costs of the program was based on 
profiles of standard farms. On the basis of a probable demand for credit for specific crops, 
an estimate was made of the probable number of each type of farm that would be eligible 
for financing. The standard budget of expenditures was then multiplied by the number of 
farms in each category. The "budgets for the standard farms were drawn up to include 
financing for most of the capital expenditures necessary to transform the structure of 
production of the farms." As discussed above, these exercises are mostly a waste of time 
and of valuable professional resources. Based on questionable assumptions, they are of little 
value for overall program implementation and frequently lead to implicit rationing criteria, 
in efforts to adjust actual disbursements to the programmed uses of the funds. 
Although by 1985 these procedures had become more sophisticated, their basic as-
sumptions were still the same. At that time, 15 model-type farms had been prepared, 
corresponding to the development of several permanent crops and horticulture. The set 
included 3 models for cocoa, 3 for macadamia nuts, 2 for rattan, 3 for carnations, 2 for sugar 
cane, and 2 for citrus fruits. Three models were prepared for the livestock activities. Invest-
ment and working capital needs for each model were then computed. Although carefully 
prepared, these farm models have relied on very rigid assumptions. Inflation, for example, 
has been not considered at all in the models. Uniform yields have been assumed, despite 
the large dispersion of observed yields even in the same region. The assumption of uniform 
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technical coefficients for beef and dairy activities has been even more heroic. Yield 
variability, in time and in space, so critical for risk analysis, has not been considered. 
Potentially useful as heuristic exercises, particularly to the extent that they force the 
credit analysts to organize their data in a logical framework, these models are costly and do 
not represent an acceptable substitute for good knowledge of actual situations and specific 
clients. There are two major risks in their generalized use. First, if taken too seriously, 
these models may induce too much rigidity in credit allocation, in terms of what is actually 
funded and how much is granted in each case. As a consequence, new crops for which the 
models have not been developed will not be financed, while usually too much credit will be 
granted to borrowers who do not fit the ideal circumstances of the models. 
Second, if the initial assumptions are incorrect, and the models substitute for a 
careful examination of specific circumstances, the borrowers may have difficulties in be-
having as assumed and default may follow. This will be particularly true if expected amorti-
zation flows are estimated on the basis of optimum yield results for all years during the life 
of the loan. If the application of the new technology is not successful or if exogenous 
circumstances (such as climate, pests) reduce yields in a given year, repayment may not 
proceed as expected.55 Similarly, estimates of project profitability may be modified by 
changes in relative prices, not considered in the models despite the long-term nature of the 
investments. 
55 J. D. Von Pischke, "Improving Donor Intervention in Rural Finance," in Dale W 
Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke, eds. Undermining Rural Development 
with Cheap Credit, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
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(4) Evaluation of Socio-Economic Impact 
The evaluation of the socio-economic impact of the loans has been an unsettled issue 
for the IDB programs at the BNCR. Methodological problems similar to those encountered 
in estimations of the demand for credit make it very difficult to successfully complete an 
impact evaluation of credit activities.56 Many have recently insisted, moreover, that an 
evaluation of the supply-side of finance, in terms of the costs and quality of financial 
services, is more appropriate.57 
The 1977 Mission reported on the results of a survey of a representative sample of 
100 borrowers undertaken in 1976, on the basis of which it was concluded that most of the 
beneficiaries had made satisfactory progress. The gross value of production of the beneficia-
ries surveyed had increased 28.7 percent, at constant prices, from the start of the program 
to the date of the survey. As suggested, such estimates always suffer from serious method-
ological deficiencies. No control group was used, in order to contrast with beneficiary 
growth trends, and from the information gathered it is impossible to isolate the impact of 
the IDB program loans from other influences on output growth. On the other hand, there 
was almost no supply-side evaluation of the program, in terms of the cost and quality of the 
56 Cristina C. David and Richard L. Meyer, "Measuring the Farm Level Impact of 
Agricultural Loans," in John Howell, ed. Borrowers and Lenders: Rural Financial Markets 
in Developing Countries, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1980. 
57 Dale W Adams, "El Enigma de Proyectos de Credito Exitosos en Mercados Finan-
cieros Fracasados," in Dale W Adams, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and J.D. Von Pischke, eds., 
Credito Agricola y Desarrollo Rural: La Nueva Vision, San Jose: The Ohio State University, 
1987. 
·. 91 
financial services provided to the borrowers and the program's impact on the intermediary's 
institutional and financial viability. 
The evaluation of the 1981loan undertaken just before the 1985 program emphasized 
the numbers of beneficiaries reached and the speed of disbursement of the loan funds.58 
While the original goal had been to reach 3,300 farmers, 4, 750 had actually benefited from 
the program by late 1984, when 85 percent of the funds had been committed, with the 
largest difference in connection with livestock loans. Particular satisfaction was expressed 
that, with 62.3 percent of the time for disbursement lapsed, 67.8 percent of the funds had 
been already disbursed. The prompt processing of loan applications was attributed to 
satisfactory compliance by the BNCR of IDB procedures. 
Concern was expressed, on the other hand, that activities not expressly considered 
in the original analysis of the operation, although not excluded under the terms of the credit 
regulations, such as poultry or spices operations, had been financed. Instructions were 
issued to avoid financing such projects in the future. This was a clear reflection of the 
targeting mentality implicit in the development of farm models and of the extent to which 
it has prevented innovation and flexible adjustments to changing market conditions. 
Another example of this rigidity was the concern expressed about the financing of bovine 
breeding stock older than the age stipulated in the regulations, despite the fact that the 
producers preferred to buy proven cows, given the ecological circumstances of their enter-
prises. 
58 Inter-American Development Bank, evaluation report F0-505 prepared by the IDB 
Field Office in Costa Rica in August, 1984. 
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The 1984 evaluation contained, for the first time, considerations about the quality of 
the services provided to the borrowers. The time to process an application, from the date 
of presentation to formalization, was estimated to range from 15 to 45 days, with an average 
of 30 days. It was claimed that the most frequent cause of the delays was the slow presenta-
tion by the beneficiaries of the legal documents required. Although this implicitly blames 
the client for the delays, the problem originates with the excessive requirements of docu-
mentation that have been incorporated in the procedures. 
In recent years, the BNCR has operated a Follow-Up and Evaluation Unit (USE), 
as part of UNDICO, the program's implementation unit described below. USE has been 
responsible for gathering, processing, and analyzing the data for the different measurements 
required by the programs. The data about the loans granted by the BNCR branches are 
brought together at UNDICO, where USE produces the information required for the 
progress reports. These half-yearly reports contain detailed information about the use of 
program funds by regions, crops, and uses. In addition to financial data, the reports contain 
physical data on investment, areas planted, animals bought, and so forth. In addition, USE 
conducts annual surveys with a 15 percent sampling of beneficiaries, for the socio-economic 
evaluation of the programs. The BNCR has encountered substantial difficulties in conduct-
ing these socio-economic evaluations. It has taken a long time for the bank to design its 
methodologies and systems. To this end, it was aided by a consultant from the Regional 
Unit of Technical Assistance (RUTA). 
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(5) Technical Assitance 
In 1977, the IDB Missions identified low productivity as the main problem of the 
Costa Rican agricultural sector. In 1985 the same Missions considered that "the produc-
tivity of farming in Costa Rica continues to be comparatively low, because little water is 
used during the dry season of the year, drainage during the rainy season is poor, and 
fertilizers, improved seeds, herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, and other inputs are not 
widely used." These deficiencies have been related, in turn, to "the shortage of credit 
resources for investment, in general, and for development of basic complementary services 
and support infrastructure."59 
Emphasis in the diagnosis has been, therefore, entirely "agronomical" and the solution 
proposed have been additional credit flows, accompanied by technical assistance. Profitabili-
ty, comparative advantages, and relative price considerations have not been emphasized. 
This "agronomical" focus has had an important impact on the viability of the activities 
promoted by the IDB at the BNCR. While it has increased operation costs for the pro-
grams, it has not been entirely successful in preventing default. 
Having identified low productivity as the key issue, the BNCR has been expected to 
provide technical assistance to all program borrowers, in an effort to increase farm pro-
ductivity. Since in earlier programs, the expected contribution of technical assistance by the 
Ministry of Agriculture was not forthcoming, the bank itself was required to provide these 
services. For this purpose, the bank was asked in 1972 to set up a Technical Assistance 
59 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: VII Agricultural Credit Program. 
Project Report." Washington, D.C.: IDB, November 1984. 
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Fund, financed with one-eighth of the interest collected. In the 1977 loan, the BNCR was 
asked to allocate at least two percentage points of the interest charged for this particular 
purpose. Since 1977, provision of this technical assistance has been the main responsibility 
of the program's executing unit (UNDICO). 
(6) Executing Unit 
The administration of the IDB programs has been the responsibility of the Programs 
Directing and Coordinating Unit (UNDICO), created in 1977. In recent years, UNDICO 
has been operating with the following structure: 
(a) International Credit Section, responsible for the operation, records, disbursement, 
and reports with respect to foreign and donor loans; 
(b) Technical Assistance Section, responsible for providing technical orientation in 
crops and livestock production to the operations financed and for giving specialized 
technical assistance to the program beneficiaries; and 
(c) Follow-up and Evaluation Unit (USE), formally structured in 1984 to deal with 
statistics, analysis, and evaluation of the program. 
In 1984, UNDICO had 34 professionals (13 veterinarians, 9 agricultural engineers 
specialized as animal scientists, 8 agricultural engineers specialized as plant scientists, 2 
forest engineers, one irrigation technician, and one bee technician). By the end of the 
decade, UNDICO's staff had grown to roughly 50 well-trained professionals. While 10 pro-
fessionals have been headquartered in the San Jose office, supported by 20 clerical staff, 
another 10 teams of roughly four members each have been spread throughout the country, 
for field level assistance to the BNCR delegados and to program beneficiaries. 
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The main activities performed by the technical assistance personnel consisted of 
monthly advisory visits to beneficiaries, the transfer of technology by means of lectures, 
meetings, and the distribution of printed materials, the application in the field of research 
results, cattle preventive health care, the evaluation of yields, plant health treatments, and 
the like. 
The UNDICO teams represent a substantial investment in human resources. They 
no doubt represent a valuable level of expertise, that should be able to make a significant 
contribution to increased agricultural productivity in selected crops and livestock activi-
ties.60 To date, however, no cost-effectiveness study of their activities has been undertaken 
or even proposed. In many respects, UNDICO has been the spearhead of agricultural mo-
dernization at the BNCR. The issue is, therefore, whether the current use of these valuable 
resources by the BNCR is cost effective, even though the IDB has presumably supported 50 
percent of this expensive payroll. 
XX. The IDB Programs: Performance 
Two of the main issues of concern about special credit programs at public agricultural 
development banks have been the magnitude of the transactions costs that they impose both 
on the intermediary and on the final borrowers as well as the high levels of repayment 
delinquency frequently observed. Although to a lesser extent than in other development 
60 Douglas H. Graham, "Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Agricultural Loan Procedures, 
Practices, and Performance," San Jose: Unpublished Report for the USAID, under the Ohio 
State University project, 1988. 
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banks, these have been critical questions, as well, in the case of the Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica, in general, and of the IDB programs implemented by this bank.61 
(1) Lending Costs 
There have been no readily available data on the costs to the BNCR of the loan 
administration and portfolio allocation, technical assistance, and credit supervision activities 
associated with the IDB programs. The required cost accounting has not been available to 
the institution and it would be very difficult to separate the IDB programs costs from the 
general BNCR expenditures. 
The most directly related source of costs is the operation of both the headquarters 
in San Jose and the field activities of the staff of UNDICO. Separate costs for UNDICO 
were available for January-September, 1989, totalling CR$ 52.4 million, to cover staff wages, 
materials, and non-personal services. The annual equivalent would be of the order of CR$ 
74 million.62 It was estimated that 89 percent of these costs were associated with technical 
assistance and 11 percent were administrative expenses. 
UNDICO technicians have participated in the process of credit allocation, in the 
evaluation of loan applications, in visits to the client, in the provision of technical assistance, 
through their recommendations about loan application approvals or rejections, in the follow-
up and supervision of the projects finance and, eventually, in collection efforts. Several 
other BNCR officials participate in the IDB program loan administration, as well, including 
61 The author is grateful for the assistance of Ronulfo Jimenez and Martha Castillo in 
the preparation of this section. 
62 Approximately US$ 1,000,000. 
97 
the branch managers, agentes and delegados, the local boards, and the bank's staff in charge 
of formalizing and recording credit activities. UNDICO professionals, on the other hand, 
participate in other non-IDB related lending activities.63 
During the first semester of 1989, UNDICO participated in the formalization' of 299 
loans under the IDB 497 program and 30 loans under the IDB 96 program and co-par-
ticipated in the granting of 800 small-producer loans under the USAID program. This 
would imply that costs per loan granted ranged between CR$ 29,141 (if all loans are con-
sidered) and CR$ 97,872 (if only the IDB loans are considered).64 Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to separate the costs associated with these two different efforts. The costs of 
the IDB program loans were most likely closer to the upper bound of the range, given the 
participation of the Rural Credit Department in the processing of the USAID portfolio. 
As of June, 1989, on the other hand, there were 3,921 loans in the portfolio of the 
IDB 497 program, the most recent and therefore most active !DB-related effort. This 
portfolio size thus implied a cost of CR$ 18,800 per loan. Similarly, UNDICO expenses 
represented 2.6 percent of an outstanding portfolio of CR$ 2,557.5 million.65 Since, in 
addition to UNDICO activities, the administration of the IDB programs involves other 
sections of the BNCR, operation costs represent over three percentage points. This raises 
63 Recently, UNDICO has been sharing with the Rural Credit Department the respon-
sibility of managing a US$ 10 million USAID small-farmer credit line. UNDICO partici-
pates in the administration of the World Bank loan for the Atlantic region, as well. 
64 The six-month costs of UNDICO were CR$ 32.2 million. Costs per loan thus ranged 
between US$ 400 and US$ 1,400. 
65 A portfolio of about US$ 35 million. Cost per loan in the portfolio was about US$ 
260. 
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the question about the appropriateness of the intermediation margin earned by the BNCR 
on the IDB program loans. 
Table 20.01 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Intermediation Margins for the IDB 497 
Program, 1987 and 1988. (Million colones). 
IDB Program 497 
Average loan balances 
IDB contribution 
BNCR contribution 
Earned income 
Total financial costs 
Interest paid IDB* 
Cost BNCR funds 
Earned default losses 
Reserved default losses 
Net earned margin 
1987 
Million CR$ 
444.4 
239.8 
204.6 
93.0 
64.9 
39.5 
25.5 
28.1 
7.3 
% 
100.0 
54.0 
46.0 
20.9 
14.6 
16.5 
12.4 
6.3 
1.6 
4.7 
1988 
Million CR$ 
1,289.5 
784.2 
505.3 
299.0 
179.0 
108.3 
70.7 
120.0 
32.0 
% 
100.0 
60.8 
39.2 
23.2 
13.9 
13.8 
14.0 
9.3 
2.5 
6.5 
* Includes interest payments and the inspection and supervision commission. The 
credit commission paid IDB on undisbursed balances, not included in these figures, 
amounted to CR$ 25.6 million in 1987 and to CR$ 21.8 million in 1988. This reduc-
es the effective margin earned by the BNCR. 
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(2) Intermediation margins 
Table 20.01 presents some rudimentary estimates of the actual intermediation 
margins for the IDB 497 program, for 1987 and 1988. The BNCR accrued 20.9 and 23.2 
percent interest on this program's portfolio, respectively. Financial costs, not including the 
IDB's credit commission, amounted to 14.6 and 13.9 percent. This left a gross interme-
diation margin of 6.3 and 9.3 percent.66 The BNCR created reserves for default losses for 
1.6 and 2.5 percent of the portfolio, resulting in net intermediation margins of 4.7 and 6.5 
percent, respectively. Under these assumptions about delinquency in the portfolio, these 
intermediation margins appear to be reasonable. In view of actual default figures, however, 
such assumptions may be overly optimistic. 
(3) Borrowing costs 
No separate information exists, on the other hand, about the transactions costs 
imposed by the IDB programs on the beneficiaries. As reported above, the BNCR rural 
borrowers have incurred in very high non-interest transactions costs. This is not surprising, 
given the BNCR's public-sector bureaucratic style of centralized decision-making, that has 
resulted in a legacy of excessive documentation, despite inadequate consideration of risk in 
the management of the portfolio. Administrative procedures of loan evaluation, monitoring, 
and collection have carried an excessive weight offormalism and supervision that has greatly 
added to both bank and borrower costs. In general, former borrowers is good standing have 
been asked to fill out the same set of forms and update and document their collateral all 
66 Compared to BNCR gross intermediation margins of 8.1 percent estimated by Gonza-
lez-Garita, Op. cit. 
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over again, as if they were new borrowers. This has happened even to borrowers applying 
for several loans in the same year.67 Another source of borrowing costs is the large 
number of trips that the customers must make to the branch if they want their loan pro-
cessed in time. 
Within this context of heavy transaction costs, the IDB procedures have been 
particularly heavy. This was a main reason not to process these loans through the Rural 
Credit Department, where procedures have been less complex. A potentially negative ex-
ternality of the IDB programs might be, therefore, the inclination to generalize the IDB 
procedure, in reflection of its impecable formality, to other BNCR operations. This is a 
questionable proposition. Is it advisable to apply the 25-page IDB package of application 
forms to non-IDB loans that currently use far less paperwork? There is not evidence yet 
that the more sophisticated IDB procedure has actually resulted in lower default rates. 
There is no well-established connection between many of the IDB procedures and a well-
performing portfolio. 
(4) Reports 
An important source of costs for the BNCR have been the numerous reports that 
UNDICO has to prepare for the IDB. According to the UNDICO staff, many of these re-
ports have had a very limited usefulness as a source of strategic information for portfolio 
67 Over the past year, the BNCR has began implementation, on a pilot scale, of the 
libreta de credito concept (equivalent to a credit card) for preferential customers at a few 
branches. This has been a very serious attempt to deal with this unnecessarily undifferenti-
ated treatment between established and new borrowers and has been very successful, thus 
far. It is not applicable to the IDB programs, however, where the procedure responds to 
the BNCR formal agreements with the IDB. 
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management. The half-yearly progress reports contain very detailed information about the 
activities financed (area planted, heads of livestock purchased), but little data of managerial 
interest, such as the state of delinquency in the portfolio. 
Particularly costly have been the annual reports on the ex-post socio-economic impact 
of the 497 program. It has been estimated that preparation of this report costs the BNCR 
about CR$ 2 million; that is, about CR$ 500 per loan in the portfolio.68 A full-time 
agricultural economists has been hired by UNDICO just to direct this effort. A survey of 
about 54 clients is undertaken each year. 
The complexity of this report has had no relationship whatsoever with the program's 
management needs.69 A reading of the report's conclusions did not reveal any discussion 
about the program's evaluation or important policy decisions. The report does no include 
any information about the quality of the services provided to the borrowers or about their 
opinion about these services. Would it not be less costly for the BNCR to hire a specialized 
consulting firm for this purpose? Nobody knows how the IDB, in turn, uses the information 
contained in these reports. 
(5) Interest rates 
The interest rates charged for the IDB program loans, as of September, 1989, ranged 
between 17 percent (irrigation) and 26 percent per year (working capital). The BNCR 
68 Approximately US$ 30,000 or about US$ 7 per loan in the portfolio. 
69 The report presents, however, a wealth of information for potential graduate students 
and for politicians needing to justify the program. See Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica. Datos Comparativos para Ia Evaluacion Ex-Post Correspondientes al Segundo 
Afio del Programa Credito BID-497 /OC-CR. 
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charged, in turn, 15 percent to small farmers through the Rural Credit Department, 27 
percent on its regular agricultural loans, and 31 percent for non-agricultural activities. In 
the case of small farmer subsidized credit, however, the BNCR received from the Ministry 
of Agriculture a compensating transfer for the differential between the rate charged a:nd the 
rate paid on its six-month certificates of deposit.70 
Given the comparatively low rate of inflation during 1989, the level of the IDB 
program interest rates was reasonable and positive in real terms, but the rationale for the 
differenciation among rates according to the purpose of the loan is questionable. These 
differentials have responded to the protectionist mentality that interest rates should be set 
according to "what the activity can pay," rather than on the basis of the opportunity cost of 
the funds and creditworthiness considerations. This has been an implicit way to subsidize 
some activities at the expense of others. Furthermore, these differentials have invited bank 
managers to channel credit for those purposes where they can charge the higher interest 
rates, with counterproductive results. It would be better to have less dispersion among 
interest rates and to add percentage points according to risk considerations to a few basic 
rates.71 
The IDB program interest rates have incorporated, on the other hand, two percent-
age points to pay for the technical assistance provided by the UNDICO professionals. One 
70 Although the interest rates charged on the IDB program loans are lower than those 
charged on other types of agricultural credit, the less agile procedure of the IDB loans adds 
considerably to non-interest transactions costs. 
71 Minor Sagot, "Estructura de Cartera y Tasas de lnteres," unpublished memo, Banco 
de Costa Rica, May, 1990. 
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question in this connection is the possibility to offer the borrowers the option to purchase 
such technical assistance from the BNCR or to pay for it elsewhere. There are no clear 
answers to this question, but some observers believe that the generalized provision of 
technical has burdened the banks with an atypical function. Should the BNCR continue to 
invest in building its own technical assistance capacity or show these technical assistance 
services be contracted out to outside specialists in the private market, with an appropriate 
margin built into the loan to cover for these expenses? An answer to this question would 
require, to begin with, an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the UNDICO technical 
assistance teams. Some valuable economies may have been gained, in this connection, by 
the consolidation of technican assistance efforts around the regional centers recently created. 
As suggested, one alternative is to let the market determine the allocation of technical 
assistance service between internal and external sources.72 
(6) Delinquency 
-
Although there has been a consensus that the problems of arrears, repayment de-
linquency, and losses due to default have been significant at the BNCR during the 1980s, 
there have been important differences among the data sets reported by various sources. 
This is not surprising, in view of the adoption of several methodologies to measure delin-
quency. What is somewhat surprising, however, is the comparatively little attention that the 
IDB Missions have paid to this problem and the sustained, optimistic, implicit assumption 
that large doses of technical assistance are a substitute for a more effective determination 
72 The recent USAID small-farmer line of credit has required that at least 15 percent 
of the technical assistance provided be contracted out. 
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of creditworthiness and vigorous collection efforts. Interestingly enough, estimates of 
delinquency at the BNCR in the IDB Reports are the lowest among all of the sources 
surveyed. 
It was already generally recognized in the early 1980s that the portfolio of the state-
owned banks suffered from serious delinquency problems. Gonzalez-Garita reported that 
in 1983, for the four state-owned banks, loans with arrears of more than 90 days represented 
23.5 percent of the total portfolio. The proportion was 21.1 percent for the BNCR. In 1985, 
furthermore, this proportion had increased to 33.0 percent for the four state-owned banks 
and to 36.0 percent in the case of the BNCR. In addition, at the BNCR, another 36.6 
percent of the portfolio suffered from arrears of less than 90 days and an additional 8.2 
percent had been sent to court for judicial action. As a result, only 27.6 percent of the 
portfolio was not contaminated and 44 percent was affected by serious delinquency. 73 
In contrast, the Report for the 1985 IDB program claimed that, as of July, 1984 
delinquent installments principal plus loans in judicial collection amounted to 19.7 percent 
of the total portfolio. This was considered to be high, specially in view of the amounts 
written off against reserves for bad debts during 1982, 1983, and the first half of 1984, for 
over CR$ 540 million. The Mission considered that "there is not the slightest doubt that 
Costa Rica cannot avoid the effects of the world economic crisis of recent years, a situation 
that continues to be a contributing factor to the growth and persistence delinquency in the 
73 Marco Antonio Gonzalez-Garita, "Eficiencia y Costos de Intermediacion Financiera: 
el Caso del Sistema Bancario Costarricense," San Jose: unpublished report to the USAID, 
1987. 
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BNCR portfolio."74 Delinquence was also attributed to the BNCR weak collection efforts, 
and the institution was required to reduce the delinquent portfolio to 14 percent one year 
after the loan was signed, and to 10 percent after three years. The total affected portfolio 
was expected to drop to 40 and 25 percent, respectively. 
As of December, 1987, only 41.8 percent of the portfolio of the Commercial Depart-
ment was not affected by delinquency, with 28.2 percent affected by arrears of more than 
90 days. Operations in judicial collection represented 4.2 percent of the total portfolio. The 
proportion of the Commercial Department's crop loans portfolio that was current was only 
39.7 percent, and 32.8 percent in the case of livestock loans. About one-half of the number 
of loans were contaminated. In addition, 89.0 percent of the portfolio was affected by 
arrears in interest payments. 75 
In the case of the Mortgage Department, 55.1 percent of the portfolio was affected 
by some form of arrears and 9.3 percent was being collected through the courts. About 47 
percent of the number of loans were affected. Not surprisingly, the Rural Credit Depart-
ment showed the best record: 67.0 percent of the loans were not affected by arrears, with 
17.9 percent affected by arrears of more than 90 days. For crop loans, 64.6 percent of the 
portfolio was not affected by delinquency and 73.0 percent in the case of livestock loans. 
Only about 39 percent of the total number of loans in the Rural Credit Department were 
affected. 
74 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: VII Agricultural Credit Program," 
Washington, D.C.: PR-1399-A, November, 1984, p. 83. 
75 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Secci6n de Estudios Econ6micos, "Estado de Servicio 
de las Colocaciones," unpublished. 
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The rescheduling of delinquent loans has been a frequent practice at the BNCR. 
These loans are then classified as current, that is, without arrears. In some instances, 
inclusion of these cases could add substantially to an upper threshold of non-performing 
loans in the portfolio. These levels of delinquency and of restructuring of loans are not 
compatible with the viability of the BNCR. What is most needed is a credit analysis that 
incorporates adjustments for risk. 
It has been generally believed that the IDB portfolio has suffered only from moderate 
forms of delinquency. The 1984 IDB Mission believed that the portfolio of programs 
financed in part with IDB resources "shows an acceptable degree of delinquency, much 
lower than that which affects the total portfolio of the BNCR. This is so in the case of the 
IDB programs, because UNDICO was established to administer this portfolio."76 . It was 
reported that 97.2 percent of the !DB-related portfolio was then current. Since there is 
a danger that this favorable performance may in part reflect the term structure of the 
portfolio (long-term loans with several years of grace periods), a very rudimentary attempt 
was made to explore the question of delinquency in the IDB programs portfolio. Table 20.2 
reports the arrears associated with the IDB 497 program as of June, 1989, for a random 
sample of four branches (Guapiles, Oreamuno, Bagaces, and Santa Cruz). In addition to 
the large differences among branches, the most outstanding result is the significant propor-
tion of rescheduling activity. About one-half of all loans had experienced one or more 
rescheduling during the semester. This intense rescheduling activity masks the true degree 
76 Inter-American Development Bank, "Costa Rica: VII Agricultural Credit Program. 
Loan Proposal," Washington, D.C.: PR-1399, November, 1984, p. 27. 
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of delinquency in the portfolio. Once all of this is taken into consideration, only 33 percent 
of the portfolio in Guapiles, 22 percent in Oreamuno, 75 percent in Bagaces, and 15 percent 
in San Cruz were not contaminated one way or another. 
Tables 20.03 through 20.07 present, in addition, the state of the portfolio of tbe dif-
ferent IDB programs for the 1983-1987 period. Although there is no information about the 
aging of the arrears, it is clear that a significant portion of these portfolios suffers from some 
form of delinquency. The data systematically shows, in addition, an increase in the degree 
of delinquency and arrears as the time passes. This information suggests that about two-
thirds of the IDB program portfolio has been contaminated by some form of arrears. 
The BNCR has used two different indicators of delinquency. One (mora legal) 
compares the balances of loans with arrears in repayment of the principal with the total 
outstanding balances. The other (mora real) is a ratio of the installments in arrears with 
respect to the total portfolio. These indicators do not provide an adequate early warning 
about default problems. To compute a flow indicator of delinquency is almost impossible, 
since amortization schedules are available only in each customer's card. 
The emphasis in the evaluation of loan applications has been placed, particularly in 
the IDB programs, on agronomic questions and the expected (theoretical) project rate of 
return. An evaluation of creditworthiness is not systematically undertaken. 
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Table 20.02 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Arrears in the IDB 497 Program Portfolio. 
Sample of Branches, for the Semester Ending June 30, 1989. 
Gmipiles Oreamuno Bagaces Santa Cruz 
Total number of loans 17 50 6 19 
Total amount outstanding 
CR$ million 4.62 13.18 1.66 15.88 
Number of loans in arrears 1 9 0 15 
Amount in arrears CR$ million 0.35 0.76 0 11.84 
Amount of expected repayment 3.42 7.03 0.16 2.88 
Amount repaid 2.22 4.15 0.12 2.86 
Amount rescheduled 1.23 1.69 0.04 2.20 
Number of reschedules 15 43 2 18 
Number of loans rescheduled 10 21 2 8 
Number of cases taken to 
court 0 10 0 3 
Number of loans with 
problems (%) 52.9 74.0 33.3 47.4 
Repayment index (%) 79.5 46.5 100.0 18.5 
Adjusted repayment index (%) 32.6 21.8 74.6 14.9 
Amount in arrears refers to the installments due during the semester and not paid or 
rescheduled. 
Expected repayment refers to the installments due during the semester. 
Amount repaid refers to the actual amortizations during the semester. 
Amount rescheduled refers to installments due during the semester that were postponed. 
Some loans were rescheduled more than once during the semester. 
Repayment index is the ratio of amounts repaid over the expected repayment minus the 
rescheduled amounts. 
Adjustment repayment index refers to the ratio of amounts repaid over expected repayment. 
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Table 20.03 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Delinquency in the IDB 323 Program 
Portfolio. (thousand colones). 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Program 323 (1972) 
Number of loans 381 314 232 174 112 
IDB 197 164 124 85 n.a. 
BNCR 184 150 108 89 n.a. 
Number in arrears 159 179 140 124 56 
IDB 85 92 77 68 n.a. 
BNCR 74 87 63 56 n.a. 
Number in arrears (%) 41.7 57.0 60.3 71.3 50.0 
IDB 43.1 56.1 62.1 80.0 n.a. 
BNCR 40.2 58.0 58.3 62.9 n.a. 
Outstanding balances 20,888 16,158 11,759 8,175 3,835 
IDB . 14,824 11,606 8,690 6,088 n.a. 
BNCR 6,064 4,552 3,069 2,087 n.a. 
Amount in arrears 2,709 2,539 2,191 1,608 1,447 
IDB 1,688 1,720 1,550 1,109 n.a. 
BNCR 1,021 819 641 499 n.a. 
Contaminated balances 9,770 10,789 6,634 5,959 2,475 
IDB 6,870 7,557 4,974 4,237 n.a. 
BNCR 2,900 3,232 1,660 1,722 n.a. 
Arrears/balances(%) 13.0 15.7 18.6 19.7 37.7 
IDB 11.4 14.8 17.8 18.2 n.a. 
BNCR 16.8 18.0 20.9 23.9 n.a. 
Contaminated/portfolio(%) 46.8 66.8 56.4 72.9 64.5 
IDB 46.3 65.1 57.2 69.6 n.a. 
BNCR 47.8 7LO 54.1 82.5 n.a. 
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Table 20.04 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Delinquency in the IDB 507 Program Portfolio. 
(thousand colones). 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
Program 507 (1977) 
Number of loans 1,162 984 767 547 
IDB 618 522 398 292 
BNCR 544 462 369 255 
Number in arrears 330 399 438 277 
IDB 170 208 228 146 
BNCR 160 191 210 131 
Number in arrears(%) 28.4 40.5 57.1 50.6 
IDB 27.5 39.8 57.3 50.0 
BNCR 29.4 41.3 56.9 51.4 
Outstanding balances 66,758 47,770 33,637 22,246 
IDB 48,902 35,053 24,041 15,953 
BNCR 17,856 12,717 9,596 6,293 
Amount in arrears 4,135 3,997 3,976 4,247 
IDB 3,200 3,109 3,044 3,357 
BNCR 935 888 932 890 
Contaminated balances 23,472 22,128 19,137 12,203 
IDB 16,237 15,450 13,170 9,479 
BNCR 7,235 6,678 5,967 2,742 
Arrears/balances (%) 6.2 8.4 11.8 19.1 
IDB 6.5 8.9 12.7 21.0 
BNCR 5.2 7.0 9.7 14.1 
Contaminated/portfolio (%) 35.2 46.3 56.9 54.9 
IDB 33.2 44.1 54.8 59.4 
BNCR 40.5 52.5 62.2 43.3 
1987 
335 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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n.a. 
n.a. 
31.9 
n.a. 
n.a. 
13,363 
n.a. 
n.a. 
3,083 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4,736 
n.a. 
n.a. 
23.1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
35.4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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Table 20.05 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Delinquency in the IDB 678 Program Portfolio. 
(thousand colones). 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
Program 678 (1982) 
Number of loans 2,239 3,315 3,318 3,461 
IDB 2,042 2,475 2,436 1,852 
BNCR 197 840 882 1,609 
Number in arrears 570 1,400 1,857 2,141 
IDB 514 996 1,231 899 
BNCR 56 404 626 1,242 
Number in arrears (%) 25.5 42.2 56.0 61.9 
IDB 25.2 40.2 50.5 48.5 
BNCR 28.4 48.1 71.0 77.2 
Outstanding balances 339,843 437,605 457,050 382,507 
IDB 316,229 346,841 352,134 261,198 
BNCR 23,614 90,764 104,916 121,309 
Amount in arrears 10,527 51,978 105,330 119,773 
IDB 4,654 27,516 53,906 49,209 
BNCR 5,873 24,462 51,424 70,564 
Contaminated balances 92,285 177,362 203,409 227,104 
IDB 90,704 158,858 182,623 138,523 
BNCR 1,581 18,504 20,786 88,581 
Arrears/balances (%) 3.1 11.9 23.0 31.3 
IDB 1.5 7.9 15.3 18.8 
BNCR 24.9 27.0 49.0 58.2 
Contaminated/portfolio(%) 27.2 40.5 44.5 59.4 
IDB 28.7 45.8 51.9 53.0 
BNCR 6.7 20.4 19.8 73.0 
1987 
6,171 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,069 
n.a. 
n.a. 
17.3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
615,664 
n.a. 
n.a. 
128,252 
n.a. 
n.a. 
177,934 
n.a. 
n.a. 
20.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
28.9 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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Table 20.06 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Delinquency in the IDB 96 Program Portfolio. (thousand 
colones). 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Program 96 (1982) 
Number of loans 1,490 1,838 1,941 1,618 1,522 
IDB 852 1,062 1,117 943 n.a. 
BNCR 638 776 824 675 n.a. 
Number in arrears 433 878 1,146 857 654 
IDB 232 507 651 511 n.a. 
BNCR 201 371 495 346 n.a. 
Number in arrears (%) 29.1 47.8 59.0 53.0 43.0 
IDB 27.2 47.7 58.3 54.2 n.a. 
BNCR 31.5 47.8 60.1 51.3 n.a. 
Outstanding balances 499,253 607,837 654,723 510,730 480,980 
IDB 273,203 354,923 386,427 309,807 n.a. 
BNCR 226,050 252,914 268,296 200,923 n.a. 
Amount in arrears 7,765 16,656 63,190 66,682 100,010 
IDB 1,154 7,504 35,405 39,869 n.a. 
BNCR 6,611 9,152 27,785 26,813 n.a. 
Contaminated balances 169,493 327,942 428,931 339,816 224,905 
IDB 89,647 193,071 254,414 207,245 n.a. 
BNCR 79,846 134,871 174,517 132,571 n.a. 
Arrears/balances (%) 1.6 2.7 9.7 13.1 20.8 
IDB 0.4 2.1 9.2 12.9 n.a. 
BNCR 2.9 3.6 10.4 13.3 n.a. 
Contaminated/portfolio(%) 33.9 54.0 65.5 66.5 46.8 
IDB 32.8 54.4 65.8 66.9 n.a. 
BNCR 35.3 53.3 65.0 66.0 n.a. 
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Table 20.07 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Delinquency in the IDB 497 Program. 
December, 1987 June 1989 
Million CR$ % Million CR$ % 
Number of loans 1,184 100.0 3,997 100.0 
curreut 1,074 90.7 3,183 79.6 
in arrears 110 9.3 814 20.4 
Outstanding balances 1,028.9 100.0 2,657.5 100.0 
Balances with arrears 146,8 14.3 546.4 20.6 
Amount of arrears 127.6 12.4 169.1 6.4 
Interest in arrears n.a. n.a. 84.8 3.2 
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(7) Technical Cooperation 
The 1985 program included US$ 240,000 for a non-reimbursable technical coop-
eration, designed to strengthen the BNCR's institutional capacity through: 
(a) improvement of the identification of new investment areas and analysis' of in-
vestment projects so as to increase the efficiency of the BNCR participation in 
"development" programs; 
(b) the strengthening of the financial and administrative procedures of the BNCR 
through the improvement of its electronic data processing system; and 
(c) to assist in the process of financial and socio-economic analysis of the projects. 
For this technical cooperation, the BNCR contracted two consultants specialized in 
the social and economic analysis of projects and in electronic data processing systems, for 
a period of 18 months each. Resources were also provided for short courses and seminars 
in Costa Rica. 
The emphasis of the technical cooperation was placed, as elsewhere, on the planning 
and targeting activities associated with supervised credit, in order to identify and evaluate 
investment projects. The focus has been mostly agronomic. In addition, the technical 
cooperation has stressed the ex-post socio-economic evaluation of the situation of the 
beneficiaries, in which the IDB has been vety interested, but which is of very marginal use 
for managerial purposes at the BNCR. Most of the effort has been concentrated, therefore, 
at USE within UNDICO, an enclave within the bank, with little impact on strengthening the 
institutional viability of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. 
Statistical Appendix 
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Cuadra 1.01 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Departamento de 
Credito Rural. Numero, Manto Real y Tamafio 
Promedio Real de los Prestamos Nuevas otorga-
dos durante el Afio. 1950-1988. 
Numero de Manto Tamafio 
Afio Prestamos { 1 000 Colones de 1978) Promedio 
1950 17,752 57,705 3,251 
1951 19,403 69,606 3,587 
1952 19,994 90,293 4,516 
1953 18,006 91,563 5,085 
1954 16,838 89,049 5,289 
1955 16,967 94,467 5,568 
1956 17,625 108,824 6,174 
1957 16,675 105,346 6,318 
1958 15,275 102,263 6,695 
1959 15,797 118,417 7,496 
1960 15,989 157,818 9,870 
1961 16,007 142,550 8,906 
1962 19,293 216,561 11,225 
1963 16,107 165,066 10,248 
1964 16,209 199,551 12,311 
1965 17,767 242,230 13,634 
1966 11,791 138,314 11,731 
1967 16,063 210,347 13,095 
1968 14,037 180,408 12,852 
1969 11,996 184,600 15,388 
1970 13' 148 193,644 14,728 
1971 17,965 274,367 15,272 
1972 15,825 243,399 15,380 
1973 16,208 260,853 16,094 
1974 19,841 241,192 12,156 
1975 23,436 203,547 8,685 
1976 24,284 226,176 9,314 
1977 21,351 210,233 9,847 
1978 19,861 235,122 11,838 
1979 18,721 199,113 10,636 
1980 15,692 135,259 8,620 
1981 18,938 126,534 6,682 
1982 22,198 108,691 4,896 
1983 18,935 131,178 6,928 
1984 19,076 105,329 5,522 
1985 16,821 83,603 4,970 
1986 18,326 111,917 6,107 
1987 11,873 83,033 6,893 
1988 13,821 110,711 8,010 
Fuentes: Gonzalez Vega (1973) y Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 
informacion sin publicar. 
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Cuadra 1.02 Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, Departamento de 
Credito Rural. Numero, Manto Real y Tamafio 
Promedio Real de los Saldos de Colocaciones 
al Final del Afio. 1950-1987. 
Numero de Saldos Saldo 
Afio Prestamos ( 1 000 Colones de 1978) Promedio 
1950 21,547 67,763 3,145 
1951 23,712 90,231 3,805 
1952 24,998 112,643 4,506 
1953 24,794 123,549 4,983 
1954 24,877 124,429 5,002 
1955 26,456 138,199 5,224 
1956 n.d. 164,089 n.d. 
1957 28,187 168,917 5,993 
1958 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1959 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
1960 28,075 229,404 8,171 
1961 n.d. 268,006 n.d. 
1962 35,190 339,040 9,635 
1963 36,071 350,912 9,728 
1964 37,732 382,532 10,138 
1965 41,218 469,137 11,382 
1966 39,141 436,070 11,141 
1967 39,964 443,510 11,098 
1968 38,465 433,441 11,269 
1969 37,252 440,892 11,835 
1970 38,015 454,416 11,954 
1971 41,992 502,971 11,978 
1972 43,085 501,469 11,639 
1973 42,880 438,280 10,221 
1974 45,715 385,316 8,429 
1975 51,173 378,516 7,397 
1976 53,234 397,120 7,460 
1977 51,261 381,215 7,437 
1978 49,260 399,505 8,110 
1979 48,165 347,724 7,219 
1980 45,563 292,113 6,411 
1981 44,552 153,276 3,440 
1982 39,344 108,973 2,770 
1983 35,591 146,321 4,111 
1984 36,650 140,214 3,826 
1985 37,971 127,156 3,349 
1986 33,731 135,687 4,023 
1987 26,178 125,718 4,802 
Fuentes: Gonzalez Vega (1973) y Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 
informacion sin publicar. 
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Cuadro 1.03 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. 
Afio 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
s./ 
Composici6n de los Saldos de las Coloca-
ciones al Final del Afio, por Sector de 
Actividad Econ6mica (Porcentajes). 
1956-1987. 
Agricultura Ganaderia Industria Otros 
40.1 13.7 12.4 33.8 
46.6 11.7 10.4 31.2 
43.9 13.4 11.0 31.7 
43.3 15.4 11.8 29.6 
43.6 16.6 12.1 27.7 
42.3 17.1 13.8 26.8 
39.9 17.7 15.4 27.0 
39.6 15.3 15.4 29.7 
37.7 15.6 16.7 30.0 
37.1 17.4 17.5 28.0 
37.5 18.4 16.7 27.4 
35.2 19.7 18.1 27.0 
34.6 21.4 18.5 25.5 
33.5 23.2 19.5 23.7 
33.9 23.2 19.9 23.0 
29.3 24.7 17.8 28.2 
26.0 26.1 18.3 29.6 
22.9 30.2 21.7 25.2 
20.7 27.3 25.3 26.7 
22.5 23.3 25.7 28.5 
23.8 22.7 25.2 28.3 
21.8 22.6 26.0 29.6 
22.1 21.4 26.5 30.0 
20.3 21.2 24.7 33.8 
21.2 21.8 22.4 34.6 
24.7 20.2 22.3 32.8 
27.5 22.6 24.6 25.2 
31.4 23.4 26.6 18.7 
31.4 23.0 27.6 18.0 
22.9 22.4 32.4 22.3 
20.9 19.5 32.0 27.6 
19.8 16.5 31.6 32.1 
s./ 
Incluye: comercio, electricidad, servicios, vivienda, ere-
dito personal, credito externo y credito no clasificado. 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, varios afios. 
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Cuadra 1.04 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. Tasas 
Anuales de Crecimiento Real de los Saldos de 
las Colocaciones, por Sector de Actividad 
Econ6mica (Porcentajes). 
Afio 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1957-1987. 
Total 
18.3 
4.3 
21.8 
10.4 
3.9 
4.8 
20.8 
13.7 
13.2 
-0.1 
2.2 
0.8 
1.6 
8.0 
23.6 
5.0 
-11.8 
3.1 
17.3 
12.1 
9.7 
13.5 
-3.4 
-5.7 
-49.5 
-22.5 
43.0 
11.9 
1.0 
4.2 
11.8 
Agricultura 
37.4 
-1.8 
20.2 
11.3 
0.7 
-1.0 
19.8 
8.1 
11.4 
1.2 
-4.2 
-1.0 
-1.4 
9.2 
6.9 
-6.8 
-22.3 
-6.9 
27.6 
18.5 
0.4 
15.3 
-11.4 
-1.4 
-41.1 
-13.7 
63.2 
11.8 
-26.5 
-4.6 
5.5 
Ganaderia 
1.5 
19.2 
40.2 
18.6 
7.2 
8.7 
4.4 
16.1 
25.8 
5.7 
9.3 
9.6 
10.4 
8.0 
31.4 
10.9 
2.1 
-6.7 
-0.1 
9.4 
8.9 
7.6 
-4.4 
-2.8 
-53.3 
-13.0 
48.0 
9.9 
-1.5 
-9.3 
- 5.4 
Industria 
0.1 
9.6 
30.6 
13.9 
18.5 
16.5 
20.6 
23.8 
18.5 
-4.8 
11.0 
3.0 
7.2 
10.1 
10.3 
8.2 
4.2 
20.2 
19.3 
9.9 
13.4 
15.4 
-9.8 
-14.5 
-49.7 
-14.4 
54.2 
16.1 
18.8 
2.9 
10.5 
g.f 
Obros 
9.3 
6.1 
13.5 
3.3 
0.5 
5.6 
33.1 
14.5 
6.0 
-2.5 
0.7 
-4.6 
-5.6 
4.7 
51.7 
10.2 
-24.8 
9.2 
25.4 
11.2 
14.7 
15.0 
8.7 
-3.6 
-52.1 
-40.4 
5.9 
8.0 
25.1 
28.8 
30.0 
gf Incluye: comercio, electricidad, servicios, vivienda, cre-
dito personal, credito externo y credito no clasificado. 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito v Cuentas Monetarias, varios afios. 
Montos deflatados con el Indice de Precios al por Mayor. 
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Cuadro 1.05 Costa Rica. Sistema Bancario Nacional: Indices 
de los Saldos de las Colocaciones, en Terminos 
Reales (1978:100), segun Sector de Actividad 
Econ6mica. 1956-1987. 
Afio 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Agricultura 
29.6 
40.7 
39.3 
48.0 
53.4 
53.8 
53.2 
63.8 
68.9 
76.8 
77.7 
74.5 
73.7 
72.6 
79.3 
84.8 
79.0 
61.4 
57.2 
72.9 
86.4 
86.7 
100.0 
88.6 
87.4 
51.5 
44.5 
72.5 
81.1 
59.6 
54.4 
57.8 
Ganaderia 
10.4 
10.6 
12.6 
17.7 
21.0 
22.5 
24.5 
25.5 
29.6 
37.3 
39.4 
43.1 
47.2 
52.1 
56.2 
73.9 
82.0 
83.7 
78.2 
78.0 
85.3 
92.9 
100.0 
95.6 
93.6 
43.4 
37.8 
55.9 
61.4 
60.5 
58.8 
51.9 
Industria 
7.6 
7.6 
8.4 
10.9 
12.2 
14.4 
16.8 
19.0 
23.2 
27.4 
25.8 
29.2 
29.4 
31.8 
35.3 
40.0 
43.7 
48.5 
58.4 
69.6 
76.4 
86.6 
100.0 
90.2 
77.2 
38.8 
33.2 
51.2 
59.5 
70.6 
72.7 
80.3 
Comercio 
41.4 
42.3 
48.1 
50.8 
45.0 
43.7 
41.4 
44.8 
45.2 
41.0 
36.5 
26.2 
22.0 
18.3 
21.6 
57.2 
67.3 
47.2 
69.8 
89.6 
93.6 
94.8 
100.0 
. 128.5 
131.8 
66.1 
46.6 
42.4 
45.8 
70.3 
103.5 
146.2 
Total 
16.3 
19.3 
20.1 
24.5 
27.1 
28.1 
29.5 
35.6 
40.5 
45.9 
45.8 
46.8 
47.2 
48.0 
51.8 
64.0 
67.2 
60.1 
61.2 
71.1 
80.3 
88.1 
100.0 
96.6 
91.1 
46.0 
35.7 
51.0 
57.1 
57.7 
60.1 
67.2 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, varios afios. Montos 
deflatados con el Indice de Precios al por Mayor. 
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Cuadra 1.06 Costa Rica. Sistema Bancario Nacional: Indices 
de los Prestamos Nuevas Otorgados durante el Afio, 
en Terminos Reales (1978:100), segun sector de 
Actividad Econ6mica. 1969-1987. 
Afio Agricultura Ganaderia Industria Comercio Total 
1969 75.6 50.4 37.3 27.7 '18.9 
1970 94.6 50.2 45.9 35.3 56.8 
1971 94.5 86.2 56.4 111.2 74.0 
1972 83.0 86.4 55.1 110.5 72.6 
1973 80.8 103.0 68.1 52.6 73.0 
1974 87.3 88.1 85.9 118.9 80.4 
1975 102.7 65.3 90.6 133.9 86.0 
1976 101.6 77.0 88.5 110.3 89.8 
1977 91.8 93.5 91.8 93.5 90.8 
1978 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1979 88.5 97.0 68.1 172.9 91.9 
1980 70.2 73.4 45.9 160.6 60.5 
1981 57.5 38.3 32.7 102.9 42.9 
1982 76.0 45.4 37.2 58.8 39.0 
1983 106.9 65.6 48.0 59.8 58.9 
1984 86.0 50.6 48.5 92.5 51.3 
1985 56.2 23.3 55.7 135.2 45.6 
1986 72.4 33.6 59.9 189.6 57.8 
1987 44.3 29.4 68.8 217.8 64.0 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito ~ cuentas Monetarias, varies afios. Montes 
deflatados con el Indice de Precios al per Mayor. 
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Cuadro 1.07 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. 
Afio 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Prestamos Nuevos Otorgados durante el Afio. 
Composici6n por Sectores de Actividad Econ6mica 
(Porcentajes). 1973-1987. 
Agricultura 
24.8 
24.3 
26.7 
25.3 
22.6 
22.4 
21.6 
25.2 
31.4 
40.7 
40.6 
37.6 
27.6 
28.0 
15.5 
Ganaderia 
20.8 
16.1 
11.2 
12.6 
15-.1 
14.7 
15.5 
17.1 
12.8 
17.8 
16.4 
14.5 
7.5 
8.5 
6.7 
Industria 
29.4 
33.7 
33.2 
31.0 
31.8 
31.5 
23.3 
19.7 
19.0 
23.4 
25.7 
29.8 
38.5 
32.6 
32.6 
Comercio 
2.8 
5.8 
6.1 
4.8 
4.0 
3.9 
7.4 
8.6 
7.5 
4.6 
4.0 
7.1 
11.7 
12.9 
12.9 
sal 
Otros 
22.3 
20.1 
22.8 
26.2 
26.3 
27.5 
32.2 
29.5 
29.3 
13.5 
13.4 
11.0 
14.7 
18.0 
18.0 
sal Incluye: electricidad, serv1c1os, vivienda, credito per-
sonal, credito externo y credito no clasificado. 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, varios afios. 
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Cuadro 1.08 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. Tasas 
Anuales de Crecimiento Real del Monto de los 
Prestamos Nuevos Otorgados cada Afio (Porcen-
tajes). 1970-1987. 
Afio 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Total 
16.0 
31.0 
-1.6 
12.5 
10.1 
7.0 
4.4 
1.1 
10.1 
-8.1 
-20.2 
-26.3 
-7.3 
17.6 
-13.0 
-11.1 
26.9 
Agricultura 
24.6 
-0.5 
-14.7 
10.6 
8.1 
17.7 
-1.1 
-9.6 
8.9 
-11.5 
-6.8 
-8.2 
20.3 
17.2 
-19.5 
-34.7 
28.7 
Ganaderia 
-3.4 
86.3 
5.5 
48.1 
-14.5 
-25.9 
17.9 
21.4 
6.9 
-3.0 
-12.3 
-44.6 
29.1 
7.9 
-22.9 
-53.9 
44.1 
Industria 
22.9 
22.9 
-2.4 
23.6 
26.3 
5.4 
-2.3 
3.7 
9.0 
-32.0 
-32.5 
-28.9 
13.7 
29.2 
1.0 
14.9 
7.5 
Comercio 
27.7 
215.1 
-0.6 
-52.4 
126.1 
12.6 
-17.6 
-15.2 
6.9 
72.9 
-7.1 
-35.9 
-42.9 
1.8 
54.7 
46.2 
40.2 
Fuente: Computado con base en Banco Central de Costa Rica, 
Credito y Cuentas Monetarias, varios afios. Montos 
deflatados con el Indice de Precios al por Mayor. 
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Cuadro 1.09 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. Razones 
Afio 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Fuente: 
de los Prestamos Nuevos de Cada Afio con Respecto 
al Valor Agregado, por Sector de Actividad Econ6-
mica. 1973-1987. 
Agricultura Ganaderia Industria Total 
44.0 73.6 35.8 22.9 
50.7 71.1 44.9 27.0 
49.6 56.8 45.0 27.7 
42.3 64.7 40.4 25.6 
28.3 76.0 36.7 21.9 
33.0 66.1 38.1 22.7 
33.7 65.5 26.9 21.1 
33.4 64.9 18.5 17.4 
27.0 36.7 15.5 15.4 
37.2 62.6 20.0 17.4 
46.7 65.3 22.8 19.5 
32.3 48.5 19.6 14.9 
21.3 20.7 20.4 11.7 
20.3 31.8 20.0 13.0 
25.2 43.1 25.2 14.4 
Computado con base en datos del Banco Central. 
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Cuadra 1.10 Costa Rica: Sistema Bancario Nacional. Razones 
de los Saldos de las Colocaciones al Final de 
Cada Afio con Respecto al Valor Agregado, por 
Sector de Actividad Econ6mica. 1973-1987. 
Afio Agricultura Ganaderia Industria Total 
1973 47.5 124.9 30.8 27.0 
1974 46.6 130.2 36.4 29.2 
1975 46.4 131.3 38.7 30.7 
1976 46.4 136.1 38.3 30.0 
1977 34.5 143.4 38.0 27.7 
1978 43.0 126.7 42.2 29.9 
1979 47.0 132.2 42.2 31.3 
1980 47.5 140.2 35.4 29.4 
1981 32.4 87.8 27.5 23.4 
1982 27.5 86.9 23.0 19.0 
1983 40.3 104.2 26.4 21.7 
1984 40.4 114.9 27.1 22.2 
1985 29.3 102.0 28.4 19.4 
1986 21.2 101.4 27.4 18.0 
1987 24.2 113.5 33.2 19.6 
Fuente: Computado con base en datos del Banco Central. 
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